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THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN CLASS ACTION, 
PART II:  LITIGATION AND LEGITIMACY, 
1981–1994 
David Marcus* 
 
The first era of the modern class action began in 1966, with revisions to 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  It ended in 1980.  
Significant turmoil roiled these years.  Policymakers grappled with the 
powerful device as advocates argued over its purpose, and judges struggled 
to create rules for the novel litigation the remade Rule 23 generated. 
This Article tells the story of the class action’s second era, which stretched 
from 1981 to 1994.  At first blush, these were quiet years.  Doctrine barely 
changed, and until the early 1990s, policymakers all but ignored the device. 
Below this surface tranquility lurked important developments in what the 
class action, newly embroiled in fundamental debates over litigation and 
legitimacy, was understood to implicate.  Critics castigated the civil rights 
class action as an emblem of the “imperial judiciary’s” rise and of courts’ 
inability to separate law from politics.  To industries targeted by plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, the securities fraud class action exemplified the “litigation 
explosion” and challenged judicial competence to screen for meritorious 
lawsuits.  The emergence of the mass tort class action as an alternative to 
legislative and administrative processes made a determination of litigation’s 
legitimate role particularly urgent. 
These second-era episodes deepened partisan divides over the class action 
and prompted new claims about what sort of private litigation could 
legitimately proceed.  The three episodes drew new and influential 
participants into fights over the class action, and they eventually reengaged 
policymakers with class action regulation.  Such developments made an era 
of significant reform all but inevitable. 
 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Arizona Rogers College of Law.  This Article has benefited 
from presentations at the annual meeting of the American Society for Legal History, Fordham 
University School of Law, the University of Arizona, and the University of Pennsylvania.  I 
owe particular thanks to Barbara Atwood, Bob Bone, Steve Burbank, Ellie Bublick, Faisal 
Chaudhry, Brooke Coleman, Andy Coan, Myriam Gilles, Jason Kreag, Alexi Lahav, Toni 
Massaro, Cathy O’Grady, Sergio Puig, Ed Purcell, Judith Resnik, and the talented editors at 
the Fordham Law Review.  I am also very grateful to the Stein Colloquium and Ben Zipursky 
for allowing me to participate.  Finally, thanks to the participants in the events I describe who 
agreed to let me interview them.  Their accounts of the important work they pursued and 
observed immensely improved my understanding of this history. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The pioneering class action litigator Robert Lieff recalls a conversation 
with Melvin Belli in a dramatic retelling of the early days of his career.  Belli, 
the colorful midcentury “King of Torts,” had just hired Lieff in 1965.  The 
new associate immediately tried to sell Belli on class actions, but Belli would 
have nothing of it: 
 BOB 
The biggest fish on the civil side is class actions.  They’re developing new 
rules where we can represent a hundred or a thousand plaintiffs at a time.  
It would be better for the clients and for the practice. 
 BELLI 
Bob, we operate on individuals.  You do that whether you’re a doctor, a 
priest who hears confession, or if you’re a lawyer. . . . 
. . . . 
You can’t mass produce the law.  You try individuals, you don’t try en 
masse from this majestic practice of ours that comes down to us through 
antiquity. 
. . . . 
It’s unethical, unconstitutional—The goddamnest under-handed 
solicitation of clients . . . .  How are we supposed to end up representing 
thousands of clients based on the representation of just one goddamn single 
little fool? . . .  Class action is a fiction.1 
Fast forward to 1994.  “[W]hen the head of the FDA announced findings 
that nicotine in tobacco is addictive,” Lieff recounts, “Mel call[ed] me at 
home on a Saturday morning” and insisted, “you’ve got to file a Class 
Action!”2 
The evolution of how lawyers like Belli thought about aggregate litigation 
is an important part of the story of the class action’s second era, one that 
lasted from 1981 to 1994.  The first era of the modern class action’s history 
began with efforts to revise Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
a process that ultimately produced revolutionary amendments in 1966 and 
ended around 1980.  Turmoil roiled these years, as Congress, rulemakers, 
litigators, and judges wrestled extensively with the new device, attempting to 
understand its potential and perils.3  The class action’s third era began in 
1995, and, like the first, witnessed significant upheaval.4  A diverse array of 
advocates pursued doctrinal change in a number of institutional settings, 
 
 1. Robert Lieff & Todd Kriedler, Kings of Tort 69–70 (Feb. 8, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 2. Id. at 93. 
 3. See generally David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I:  Sturm 
und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587 (2013) [hereinafter Marcus, Sturm].  For a 
history of the class action from 1938 to 1966, see generally David Marcus, Flawed but Noble:  
Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 
657 (2011). 
 4. I plan to provide an account of this era in a future article. 
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including Congress, the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee (the 
“Advisory Committee”), the U.S. Supreme Court, and the federal courts of 
appeals. 
This Article tells the story of the class action’s second era.  At first blush, 
it comes off as quiet compared to what came before and after.  The pace of 
doctrinal evolution slowed considerably in the 1980s—except in mass tort 
cases—and Rule 23 fell off legislators’ and rulemakers’ agendas.  Only near 
the era’s end did several exogenous shocks—the asbestos-litigation crisis, the 
rapid expansion of Silicon Valley, and the aftermath of the Savings and Loan 
(“S&L”) crisis—awaken the class action from what seemed like a sleepy 
decline. 
But the 1980s and early 1990s witnessed important developments in how 
lawyers, judges, policymakers, and commentators thought and talked about 
class actions and their significance.  The ink on the 1966 amendments had 
hardly dried before those engaged with class action law and policy began to 
clash over how best to understand the device.  In my history of the first era, 
I explain how proponents of a powerful class action advocated for what I 
label its “regulatory conception.”5  By this view, the class action existed to 
enable the enforcement of a substantive-liability regime on behalf of an 
undifferentiated group of regulatory beneficiaries.  Those who favored a 
limited class action championed the “adjectival conception,” an 
understanding that the device operated as a mere joinder mechanism to 
enable litigation to proceed more efficiently.6  Adversaries in the heated class 
action wars of the 1970s argued for one conception or the other as they battled 
over the evolution of a fledgling body of doctrine. 
Clashes over the class action’s proper conception, therefore, were nothing 
new by the 1980s.  During the second era, however, these fights became 
increasingly entangled with fundamental debates over what litigation could 
legitimately and competently accomplish in a complex democratic society.  
As the significance of the battles over the class action deepened, and as their 
dramatis personae changed, the battles grew more pressing and partisan.  
Conservative critics of the “imperial judiciary” castigated the civil rights 
class action as a prominent example of how antidiscrimination and poverty 
litigation pushed judges to ignore the boundary between law and politics as 
groups pursued political change in the courts.7  While such critiques stirred 
in the 1970s, they became Reagan administration gospel in the 1980s.8  The 
partisan divide over the class action deepened in the early 1990s, when a 
powerful set of industry interests that had previously ignored the class action 
connected its use in securities fraud litigation to narratives about a 
pathological “litigation explosion.”9  These efforts rekindled congressional 
interest in the reform of aggregate procedure.  The class action’s entry into 
the mass tort arena did not generate partisan conflict, but it forced the federal 
 
 5. Marcus, Sturm, supra note 3, at 592–94. 
 6. Id. at 594. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part III.A.  
 9. See infra Part IV.  
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judiciary to grapple with the boundaries of its legitimate power with 
particular urgency.  Personal injury lawyers of Belli’s ilk confronted the class 
action for the first time, and the federal courts of appeals returned to their 
supervisory role for class action doctrine. 
My history of the modern class action’s second era proceeds as follows.  
Part I describes how an era of apparent tranquility began in the early 1980s.  
Antitrust and civil rights cases—the two main categories of class actions in 
the 1970s—withered, and the class action fell off the agendas of the Advisory 
Committee, Congress, and appellate courts.  Part II sets up a discussion of 
how the class action grew deeply entangled in fundamental and increasingly 
polarized debates over litigation and legitimacy.  To critics of American civil 
justice, the 1970s witnessed the rise of an imperial judiciary and the 
worsening of a litigation explosion.  Defenders, in contrast, celebrated the 
emergence of public law litigation and courts’ involvement in a host of social, 
political, and economic problems that were previously routed to other 
branches of government.  This debate over litigation’s proper use had clear 
relevance to arguments over whether the regulatory or adjectival conception 
better captured what the class action could legitimately accomplish. 
Parts III, IV, and V describe three episodes during which debates over 
litigation and legitimacy unfolded in key class action contexts.  In Part III, 
this Article explains how conservative critics during the Reagan years 
insisted that antidiscrimination class actions and class actions sponsored by 
the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) exemplified the problems of an 
imperial judiciary.  Part IV turns to the mass tort class action and 
demonstrates how personal injury claims brought new lawyers and 
institutions into the network of those engaged with doctrinal development.  
The mass tort class action rendered the regulatory conception irrelevant as a 
normative foundation for a powerful class action device, and it pushed judges 
to confront openly limits on the legitimate exercise of their power.  Part V 
documents the origins of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA) in efforts by accounting firms and Silicon Valley to protect 
themselves from securities fraud class actions.  This episode connected the 
class action to narratives about the litigation explosion and the policy issues 
implicated by this phenomenon. 
This Article’s organization and content reflect two historiographic choices.  
The first choice involves what I emphasize.  My treatment of the modern 
class action’s first era covered a lot of ground as I attempted to document 
how lawyers, judges, politicians, and others wrestled with the new device, 
and how courts ultimately domesticated the class action with a set of doctrinal 
constraints.  My history of the second era stresses discourse and rhetoric, with 
less attention paid to doctrinal change.  The slowed pace of this change is one 
reason for this emphasis, but more important to the choice is my sense of how 
the class action’s second era fueled the tumult of its third.  According to one 
prominent theory, a particular policy changes disjointedly, with periods of 
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quiet stability punctuated by abrupt dislocations.10  Disruptions occur when 
networks of those interested in the policy expand and diversify,11 when such 
interested personnel redefine the issues the policy is understood to implicate, 
and when such issues open new institutional venues for the pursuit of 
reform.12  The three episodes at the core of the class action’s story from 1981 
to 1994 triggered these developments, especially changes to issues that the 
class action was understood to implicate.  The significant efforts to change 
the class action in the third era owe their origins to fights over litigation and 
legitimacy during its second. 
My second choice is to eschew a strictly chronological account of the era.  
Each episode starts over in time, beginning in the 1970s and ending in the 
early 1990s.  In a number of respects, each episode proceeded independently 
of the others.  The personnel involved in each differed, and, on the surface, 
the key events had little to do with each other.  A year-by-year chronology of 
the class action’s second era would bog down in a mess of details regarding 
seemingly unconnected events in disparate legal fields.  This Article’s 
organization better highlights what these episodes have in common:  the 
development of arguments about litigation and legitimacy that had important 
implications for the course of class action history. 
I.  THE CLASS ACTION’S QUIET DECADE 
In 1986, a barely elected first-term senator named Mitch McConnell13 
introduced a bill called the “Litigation Abuse Reform Act.”14  Targeting 
damages for noneconomic losses and other tort bugaboos, McConnell’s 
proposal also included a provision that would have slashed attorneys’ fees in 
class actions.15  Although the Senate Judiciary Committee held two days of 
hearings on the proposed bill, the class action piece went all but unmentioned.  
The proposed legislation proceeded no further.16 
After a busy fifteen years, 1981 began a mostly quiet decade for class 
action law and policy.17  The years certainly witnessed significant cases, 
 
 10. Bryan D. Jones & Frank R. Baumgartner, From There to Here:  Punctuated 
Equilibrium to the General Punctuation Thesis to a Theory of Government Information 
Processing, 40 POL’Y STUD. J. 1, 3 (2012); see also David F. Prindle, Importing Concepts from 
Biology into Political Science:  The Case of Punctuated Equilibrium, 40 POL’Y STUD. J. 21, 
29 (2012) (describing the theory as “spectacularly influential”). 
 11. Frank R. Baumgartner & Bryan D. Jones, Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems, 
53 J. POL. 1044, 1048 (1991). 
 12. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 16 (1993); Baumgartner & Jones, supra note 11, at 1049. 
 13. McConnell won the election in 1984 by four-tenths of a percent. FED. ELECTION 
COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 84:  ELECTION RESULTS FOR U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE 
AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 20 (1985). 
 14. 132 CONG. REC. 1667 (Feb. 5, 1986) (statement of Sen. McConnell). 
 15. See id. at 1668. 
 16. Litigation Abuse Reform Act of 1986:  Hearings on S. 2038 and S. 2046 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 169 (1986) (statement of Peter Perlman, President, 
Association of Trial Lawyers of America); id. at 184 (statement of Aaron J. Broder, Member, 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 17. E.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:  PURSUING PUBLIC 
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 22 (2000). 
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debates over the class action’s proper scope and power continued, and class 
action litigation continued to evolve.  Most significantly, civil rights and 
antitrust class action practices declined.  But, except for the fitful emergence 
of the mass tort class action, changes to the class action landscape happened 
mostly incidentally in the 1980s, as side effects of other phenomena. 
A.  The First Era in Brief 
My history of the modern class action’s first era began in the early 1950s, 
with the first attempt to amend Rule 23, and ended in 1980, with the failure 
of a Carter administration effort to replace the Rule with a legislated 
alternative.18  I argued that, while the authors of the 1966 Rule did not fully 
anticipate the implications of the procedure they created, lawyers, judges, and 
others quickly understood that the recreated class action had major 
implications for a variety of substantive liability regimes.19  What ensued was 
a decade and a half of tumult.  Proponents praised the class action as an 
essential substitute for overmatched or captured regulatory agencies, and 
adversaries denounced it as a dangerous threat to free enterprise.20  In short 
order, these combatants developed the sort of arguments for and against a 
robust class action device that would be familiar to any present-day 
participant in fights over aggregate procedure.  Throughout the 1970s, 
Congress and the Advisory Committee struggled, mostly inconclusively, to 
respond to various proposals either to eviscerate the new class action or to 
liberate it.21 
I also argued that the courts stepped in where legislators and rulemakers 
failed.  By the end of the 1970s, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals 
had forged a body of doctrine that enabled litigants to bring sizable, important 
cases, but also imposed limits that hedged against an unbound class action.22  
Lower courts, on the one hand, crafted the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, 
turning the reliance element into a common issue for plaintiffs’ claims in 
securities fraud cases and thereby enabling courts to certify securities fraud 
classes.23  On the other hand, the Supreme Court insisted that individualized 
notice be sent to all class members, whenever possible.24  This holding 
created litigation costs that limited securities fraud litigation to a small 
number of highly capitalized plaintiffs’ firms.25  A pragmatic balance of this 
sort emerged in each of the major substantive areas in which the class action 
took root.26  It reflected a jurisprudential compromise.  Courts sometimes 
countenanced concerns about ensuring the efficacy of regulatory regimes.  In 
other instances, they stressed the need to ensure that class litigation remain 
 
 18. See generally Marcus, Sturm, supra note 3. 
 19. See id.  
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. at 614–22.  
 22. See id. at 630–31.  
 23. See id. at 632.  
 24. See id. at 633.  
 25. See id.  
 26. See id. at 652.  
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something that an enthusiast for traditional, individualized adjudication 
would recognize. 
B.  Legal Change During the Second Era 
1.  Case Law 
Mass torts aside, 1980s era cases suggest little of the ferment that engulfed 
Rule 23 during its first fifteen years.27  The 1966 amendments required 
federal courts to assemble a body of class action doctrine from scratch, a task 
considerably complicated by the novelty of so many of the relevant 
substantive regimes.  Naturally, the pace of doctrinal evolution slowed as 
time passed and fewer fundamental questions remained wholly open.  During 
the first era, courts had to resolve issues that implicated the viability of entire 
swaths of class action litigation.  Comparatively technical issues commanded 
judicial attention during the second era.  How best to calculate fees for class 
counsel28 and whether Rule 23(b)(2) members can have opt-out rights29 were 
important questions but did not promise answers that would considerably 
expand or contract categories of litigation.  Other issues of similarly modest 
significance included the standing of absent class members to appeal,30 the 
lawfulness of fluid recovery and cy pres,31 Rule 23(b)(1)’s scope,32 and 
restrictions on class counsel’s communications with class members.33 
The Supreme Court did not tackle many issues of class action procedure 
during the second era, deciding only seven such cases between 1981 and 
1994.34  Very few of its decisions dramatically impacted what types of 
classes would get certified or what sorts of settlements would win approval.  
 
 27. For a masterful summary of the extant doctrinal and policy questions involving Rule 
23 in the early 1990s, see Letter from Edward H. Cooper to Civil Procedure Buffs (Jan. 21, 
1993), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV1993-05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U5H5-QWVC] (letter available at tab III-A).  
 28. See generally Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees (Oct. 8, 1985), 
in 108 F.R.D. 237 (1986). 
 29. E.g., Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1153–55 (11th Cir. 1983); Plummer 
v. Chem. Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 657 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 30. E.g., Croyden Assocs. v. Alleco, Inc., 969 F.2d 675, 676 (8th Cir. 1992); Walker v. 
City of Mesquite, 858 F.2d 1071, 1073–74 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 31. E.g., Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 
1990) (discussing the lawfulness of cy pres); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675–77 (7th Cir. 
1981) (discussing fluid recovery).  On Simer’s importance, see infra Part IV.A.3; infra notes 
367–68. 
 32. SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., 
Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 291–92 (2d Cir. 1992); Namoff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
Inc. (In re Dennis Greenman Sec. Litig.), 829 F.2d 1539, 1545–46 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 33. E.g., Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 104 (1981). 
 34. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51–52 (1991); Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985); Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 881–82 (1984); Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 662 (1983); 
Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 
991, 1011–12 (1982); Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 89; cf. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 
122 (1994) (dismissing writ as improvidently granted).  Of course, the Court decided other 
cases that had significance for class action practice. See generally Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 
755 (1989). 
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Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,35 while surely important, has a disputed 
legacy.  The decision effectively constitutionalized notice and opt-out rights 
for damages class actions.36  But it also rejected the defendant’s argument 
that due process requires out-of-state class members to opt in to join a 
multistate class,37 a holding that would have thwarted many large class 
actions.38  The Court also rejected the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision to 
apply Kansas substantive law to claims of class members from different 
states.39  Commentators disagree over the significance of this holding,40 but 
one leading plaintiffs’ lawyer, reflecting twenty years hence, denied that 
Shutts had a significant impact on the certification of multistate classes.41 
In General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,42 the Court largely 
ended the certification of broad Title VII classes based on little more than an 
allegation of company-wide discrimination.  The majority insisted that courts 
should not presume a common or typical course of treatment for all class 
members just because the class representative alleges that discrimination 
tainted her hiring or promotion in some manner.43  Rather, class certification 
requires “significant proof” of a common course of discriminatory 
treatment.44  Falcon ultimately provided an important buttress45 for the 
Court’s 2011 opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,46 but in the 1980s, 
as one prominent civil rights litigator recalls, it did little to change the course 
of civil rights litigation.47 
The Court’s few decisions mostly involved peripheral issues that did not 
significantly affect what sorts of classes got certified, incentives to litigate 
class actions, or the design of settlements.  The lower federal courts likewise 
generated little memorable case law apart from some mass tort decisions.  
Indeed, the courts of appeals largely exited the network of institutions 
involved in class action law and policy.  The Supreme Court cut off an avenue 
 
 35. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 36. See id. at 811–12. 
 37. Id. at 814. 
 38. E.g., Robert H. Klonoff, Introduction to the Symposium, 74 UMKC L. REV. 487, 488 
(2006). 
 39. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 821. 
 40. Compare Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents:  Class Settlement 
Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1912–16 (2006), 
with Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch:  The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and 
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1945–46 (2006). 
 41. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Manageable Nationwide Class:  A Choice-of-Law Legacy 
of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 74 UMKC L. REV. 543, 546 (2006). 
 42. 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
 43. Id. at 158–59. 
 44. Id. at 159 n.15. 
 45. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–53 (2011). 
 46. 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 47. Telephone Interview with Joseph M. Sellers, Partner, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll 
PLLC (May 16, 2016). 
1794 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
for interlocutory review of class-certification decisions in 1978,48 sidelining 
the circuits as stewards of class-certification doctrine.49 
2.  The Advisory Committee 
After a decade of hand-wringing over Rule 23, the Advisory Committee 
declared a “moratorium” on its consideration of class action issues at the end 
of the 1970s.50  The Advisory Committee thus sidelined a set of plaintiff-
friendly proposals that a special committee of the American Bar Association 
submitted in 1986.51  Building on mid-1970s law reform efforts, the Special 
Committee on Class Action Improvements recommended replacing Rule 
23(b)’s trifurcated approach to class certification with a single superiority 
requirement.52  The Special Committee also suggested that an amended Rule 
23 make opt-out rights and notice in cases for monetary relief optional.53  
These proposals exemplified the Special Committee’s contention that 
privately instituted class actions are important procedural “tool[s] affording 
significant opportunities to implement important public policies”54 and, thus, 
that Rule 23 should “not be thwarted by unwieldy or unnecessarily expensive 
procedural requirements.”55 
The Advisory Committee ignored the Special Committee’s 
recommendations until December 1990, when work on a Rule 23 revision 
modeled explicitly on the report’s suggestions began.56  Intending to increase 
district-judge discretion to certify classes, a November 1992 draft of Rule 23 
proposed to (1) eliminate the three Rule 23(b) categories in favor of a single 
 
 48. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476–77 (1978). 
 49. 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1802 (3d 
ed. 1998). 
 50. Letter from Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. 
Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 17, 
1993), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committ 
ee-rules-civil-procedure-may-1993 [https://perma.cc/P7UP-F82U].  Jack Weinstein proposed 
an amendment to Rule 23 in 1985 that would have required disclosure of fee-sharing 
arrangements among class counsel.  It languished on the Committee’s inactive agenda. Rule 
23 Class Actions (Oct. 1, 1988), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed 
on CIS No. CI-8510-95-1988 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
 51. See generally Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Litig., Report and Recommendations of the 
Special Committee on Class Action Improvements (July 1985), in 110 F.R.D. 195 (1986) 
[hereinafter Special Committee Report]. 
 52. Id. at 204; see also Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Nov. 
12–14, 1992), in 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 169, 171 (1997) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS], 
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/jul2015/Working 
Papers-Vol1.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4GS-59MZ]; Special Comm. on Unif. Class Actions Act, 
Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Class Actions Act (July 31–Aug. 6, 
1976), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7504-60 
(Cong. Info. Serv.).  
 53. Special Committee Report, supra note 51, at 197–98, 207–08. 
 54. Id. at 204. 
 55. Id. at 198. 
 56. Letter from James E. Macklin, Jr. to Henry Kantor (June 3, 1988) (on file with author); 
Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Nov. 29–Dec. 1, 1990), in 
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 52, at 162. 
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superiority test; (2) relax the notice requirement; (3) give judges the 
discretion to eschew opt out rights, or, in appropriate cases, to require class 
members to opt in; and (4) allow interlocutory review of class-certification 
decisions.57  The draft made its way to the Advisory Committee in 1993 but 
no further.58  A lack of enthusiasm for the proposed reworking59 led to its 
demise in 1994.60  The Advisory Committee ultimately appreciated that a 
revision based on a 1986 report that owed its ideas to proposals dating from 
the mid-1970s did not adequately respond to challenges that had emerged by 
the mid-1990s, especially those posed by mass tort and settlement class 
actions.61 
3.  Congress 
The class action weathered intense congressional scrutiny in the late 
1970s.62  As Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang observe, newly empowered 
conservatives at the start of the Reagan administration “well understood that 
private enforcement of statutory rights had been growing steeply, and they 
saw it as a critical obstacle to their regulatory reform agenda.”63  In the 1970s, 
Democrats and Republicans alike supported what Burbank and Farhang call 
“private enforcement retrenchment,” but such efforts to limit private 
litigation came overwhelmingly from Republican corners starting in the 
1980s.64  The Reagan administration pursued an ambitious program of 
litigation retrenchment.65 
But not until the early 1990s did the class action per se return to legislative 
agendas in any sustained or significant way.66  The few statutes enacted 
during the second era addressed picayune matters.67  Of course, signals 
 
 57. Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Nov. 22, 1991), in 
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 52, at 167. 
 58. See Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Oct. 21–23, 1993), 
in WORKING PAPERS, supra note 52, at 174–75.  For the language of the proposed draft rule, 
see November 1992 Proposed Amendment to Rule 23, in WORKING PAPERS, supra note 52, at 
3–12.  
 59. Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Oct. 21–23, 1993), in 
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 52, at 175. 
 60. Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Oct. 20–21, 1994), in 
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 52, at 194. 
 61. Id.; see also Letter from Patrick E. Higginbotham, Chair of Advisory Comm. on Civil 
Rules, to the Standing Comm. on Rules (Dec. 13, 1995), in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE REPORT DECEMBER 1995 (1995), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/fr_import/CV12-1995.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2QN-PCXD]. 
 62. Marcus, Sturm, supra note 3, at 620–22. 
 63. STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT:  THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 26 (2017). 
 64. Id. at 37–39. 
 65. E.g., Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died:  Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 380. 
 66. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 63, at 38. 
 67. In several instances, Congress put limits on damages recoverable in cases for statutory 
penalties, such as $500,000 or 1 percent of the defendant’s net worth. See 12 U.S.C. § 4010 
(2012); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1854 (2012); 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(2) (2012).  Another law 
authorized manufacturers, retailers, and distributors of children’s clothing to sue the federal 
government in the U.S. Court of Claims for losses connected with a ban on the use of a certain 
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beyond enacted legislation suggest congressional interest in class action 
litigation.  The propriety of class actions underwritten by the LSC surfaced 
continually in legislative debates.68  Oversight of federal agencies, 
particularly of Clarence Thomas’s Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), indicated keen legislative interest in the connection 
between class actions and the enforcement of civil rights laws.69  But, as the 
fate of McConnell’s bill illustrates, the legislative pursuit of sweeping—or 
even modest—changes to the class action sparked little sustained support. 
Other indicators suggest the class action’s low political salience in the 
1980s.  The “support structure” pursuing right-leaning law reform during the 
Reagan years almost totally ignored the class action as a policy concern unto 
itself.70  The fledgling conservative public-interest-law movement71 pursued 
a wide range of issues in the 1980s, including those involving property rights 
and environmental policy, with a clear emphasis on limiting governmental 
power.72  But only one of the leading organizations appears to have identified 
class action doctrine as a concern, and it did so only in the context of 
employment litigation.73  Tort reform efforts in the early 1980s and 1990s 
ignored the class action.74  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s National 
Chamber Litigation Center, founded in 1977, would eventually engage in 
class action reform efforts.75  Not until the late 1990s, however, did it 
demonstrate much interest in the procedure.76  Only one of the conservative 
 
chemicals but prohibited them from bringing class actions. Pub. L. No. 97-395, 96 Stat. 2001 
(1982).  A final law authorized the Commodities Futures Trading Commission to determine 
by rule whether class actions could be brought against futures traders. 7 U.S.C. § 18(a)(2) 
(1994). 
 68. See infra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 69. See infra notes 226–45 and accompanying text. 
 70. On the notion of a “support structure” and its importance to law reform, see generally 
CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:  LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Support Structures and 
Constitutional Change:  Teles, Southworth, and the Conservative Legal Movement, 36 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 516 (2011). 
 71. E.g., Nancy Blodgett, The Ralph Naders of the Right, A.B.A. J., May 1984, at 71, 71–
72; see also NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL:  PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980S 
AND BEYOND 74 (1989); Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1460–511 
(1984). 
 72. See, e.g., Houck, supra note 71, at 1460–511; Dana L. Thomas, More Freedom 
Fighters:  Some Public Interest Law Firms Oppose Big Government, BARRON’S NAT’L BUS. 
& FIN. WKLY., Aug. 15, 1977, at 5, 10. 
 73. LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT 63, 64 (1985). 
 74. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 75. Anna Palmer, Chamber Shuffles Staff After Counsel Exit, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 13, 
2006, at 2. 
 76. For indications of the Chamber of Commerce’s priorities before the 1980s, see, e.g., 
EPSTEIN, supra note 73, at 60.  A May 1985 list of the National Chamber Litigation Center’s 
“victories” and “ongoing cases” did not include one involving an issue of class action 
procedure. Nat’l Chamber Litig. Ctr., Case List (May 1985) (on file with the Hoover 
Institution, Edwin Meese Papers, Box 645, Folder C3).  A 1984 “Fact Sheet” described the 
center’s victories as “check[ing] the power of labor unions, prevent[ing] regulatory agencies 
from issuing rules that would have cost business millions of dollars, protect[ing] business 
privacy and champion[ing] corporate free speech.” National Chamber Litigation Center, Fact 
Sheet 1 (Nov. 1984) (on file with the Hoover Institution, Edwin Meese Papers, Box 645, 
Folder C3).  The Chamber of Commerce played little role in the lobbying effort behind the 
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and business groups active in the 1980s filed an amicus brief in Shutts, and 
only one did so in Falcon.77  Other priorities for civil justice reform clearly 
ranked higher on reformers’ agendas.78 
C.  The Quiet Decline 
The class action moved to the back burner for several reasons.  The limits 
the federal courts fashioned for the device likely calmed fears among Rule 
23’s natural adversaries that it would “literally dismember large numbers of 
business enterprises,” as a business lobbyist worried in 1970.79  The 1980s 
gave these adversaries more to cheer.  Paul Carrington, the Advisory 
Committee’s reporter, insisted in 1988 that “class actions had their day in the 
sun and kind of petered out.”80  Existing data are too poor to confirm this 
claim.81  But the two best-established types, antitrust and civil rights class 
actions, appeared to collapse over the course of the decade.  The class action’s 
low political salience makes sense in light of this apparent retreat. 
1.  The Civil Rights Class Action 
Class actions litigated under Rule 23(b)(2), most of which involve civil 
rights claims, composed the largest slice of the class action pie in the 1970s.82  
In 1989, a leading civil rights litigator declared that the “class action is 
dead.”83  A precipitous decline in the number of civil rights class actions 
during the 1980s is consistent with a number of developments. 
 
PSLRA, enacted in 1995. Telephone Interview with Hon. Mark Gitenstein, Special Counsel, 
Mayer Brown LLP (June 22, 2016). 
 77. A list of briefs filed in each case is available at the “Filings” tab for the case on 
Westlaw.  For amicus brief practices of this time, see EPSTEIN, supra note 73, at 149.  On the 
filing of amicus briefs in cases involving enforcement through private civil litigation, see 
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 63, at 160–61. 
 78. A literal example comes from a report compiled for the 1986 White House Small 
Business Conference, which included the proposal that Congress “[l]imit class action suits to 
those with provable economic loss” as seventh (out of seven) on its list of civil justice reform 
priorities. 132 CONG. REC. E1300–01 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1986) (statement of Rep. Porter). 
 79. Marcus, Sturm, supra note 3, at 612 (quoting a representative of the National Small 
Business Association). 
 80. Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
1988, at B7; see also Nicholas C. McBride, Class-Action Suit out of Fashion in Today’s Law 
Cases, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 4, 1988), https://www.csmonitor.com/1988/ 
0204/dsuit.html [https://perma.cc/VF4A-6ZS5]. 
 81. Statistics gathered by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts suggest that the 
class action declined considerably in the 1980s, a phenomenon occasioned in large measure 
by the near disappearance of antitrust and employment discrimination class actions. See, e.g., 
1999 Federal Court Class Action Statistics, 21 CLASS ACTION REP. 304, 305–10 (2000).  But 
these data are flawed, and indeed there are no reliable data on class action filings from these 
years. See Deborah R. Hensler, Happy 50th Anniversary, Rule 23!  Shouldn’t We Know You 
Better After All This Time?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1602 n.14 (2017) (describing the 
problems with this data). 
 82. ARTHUR R. MILLER, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS:  PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE 46 (2d ed. 1977). 
 83. Tom Wicker, No Place for Lucas, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1989, at 29; see also Ann 
Pelham, Civil-Rights Plaintiffs Are Used to Setbacks; New Rulings Add Obstacles to Difficult 
Journey, LEGAL TIMES, June 19, 1989, at 3. 
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The civil rights bar diminished during the 1980s,84 so much so as to prompt 
judicial comment by the end of the decade.85  A couple of prominent 
nonprofit organizations that had dominated the employment discrimination 
field in the 1970s86 had decreased their activity by the end of the 1980s, in 
part because of the increased resources this litigation required.87  The for-
profit bar did not replace this lost capacity until later,88 a lag consistent with 
the fact that Title VII litigation more generally was not financially attractive 
to lawyers until Congress amended the statute in 1991 to enable the recovery 
of compensatory and punitive damages.89  Also, the pace of filings in the 
1970s was probably unsustainable.  One prominent civil rights lawyer 
recalled that some of the young lawyers populating the public interest ranks, 
however well intentioned, “didn’t really have the foggiest idea what it would 
take” to successfully litigate a class action.90  A dose of reality likely drove 
less sophisticated lawyers from the civil rights class action field.91 
The employment discrimination class action might have been a victim of 
its own success, at least to a degree.  The first generation of Title VII litigation 
and other forces had helped to eliminate explicitly stated policies of 
discrimination,92 and by the end of the 1980s few employers continued to 
 
 84. See ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS:  VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND 
BEYOND 5 (1992); Howard S. Erlanger et al., Law Student Idealism and Job Choice:  Some 
New Data on an Old Question, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 851, 862 n.22 (1996); David L. Rose, 
Twenty-Five Years Later:  Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity Law 
Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1160–61 (1989). 
 85. See, e.g., Robinson v. Ala. State Dep’t. of Educ., 727 F. Supp. 1422, 1431 (M.D. Ala. 
1989); Norwood v. Charlotte Mem’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 720 F. Supp. 543, 555–56 (W.D.N.C. 
1989); Stokes v. City of Montgomery, 706 F. Supp. 811, 817 (M.D. Ala. 1988). 
 86. These included the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) and the Washington Lawyers’ 
Committee for Civil Rights. Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private 
Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 924–25 (1978); 
see also J.E.M., The Bonhomie of the Plaintiff Bar, JURIS DR., Sept. 1974, at 31, 31. 
 87. Barry Goldstein describes the LDF as “essentially geared to law reform, appellate brief 
writing, Supreme Court brief writing.” Telephone Interview with Barry Goldstein, Of Counsel, 
Goldstein, Borgen, Dardarian & Ho (Apr. 14, 2016).  He further noted that the LDF was not 
“set up to litigate complex cases in the way that you need to do it” with “experienced 
lawyers . . . , associates at different levels, paralegals, putting in hundreds of thousands of 
dollars and sometimes seven figures into a case.” Id.; see also STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE 
RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 82 (1995) (reporting a rise in NAACP 
litigation expenses from $500,000 in the mid-1960s to $3.2 million in 1981). 
 88. Telephone Interview with Barry Goldstein, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with 
Joseph M. Sellers, supra note 47. 
 89. Sean Farhang & Douglas M. Spencer, Legislating Incentives for Attorney 
Representation in Civil Rights Litigation, 2 J.L. & CTS. 241, 249–50 (2014). 
 90. Telephone Interview with Barry Goldstein, supra note 87. 
 91. See In Camera, 7 CLASS ACTION REP. 253, 253 (1982); Sharon Walsh, The Vanishing 
Job-Bias Lawyers:  Attorneys, Law Firms Say They Can’t Afford to Try Rights Cases, WASH. 
POST, July 6, 1990, at C1; cf. Brief for Twelve Small, Private Civil Rights Law Firms as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean 
Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987) (No. 85-5) (discussing the financial precariousness of a civil rights 
practice). 
 92. J. LeVonne Chambers & Barry Goldstein, Title VII at Twenty:  The Continuing 
Challenge, 1 LAB. LAW. 235, 247 (1985); Paul Frymer, Acting When Elected Officials Won’t:  
Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions, 1935–85, 97 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 483, 493–95 (2003). 
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discriminate in the old, easily recognized Jim Crow manner.93  “Broad 
patterns of discrimination continued,” the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights noted in 1991, “but in subtler forms which required a much greater 
investment of time and money to prove.”94  The shift from a manufacturing 
to a service economy added to this difficulty, as discretionary promotion and 
hiring criteria in the latter fields made discrimination harder to identify and 
prove.95  A changing landscape in poverty law might have pushed the number 
of other civil rights filings down as well.  Lawyers certainly pursued 
important benefits-related litigation during the Reagan years.96  But the due 
process revolution had crested by the 1980s, a trajectory that might have 
depressed some types of litigation. 
Doctrinal changes mostly outside the domain of class action procedure 
may have made civil rights litigation more difficult to pursue, although 
probably not to a significant extent.  Courts fashioned relatively low 
certification requirements for civil rights classes during Rule 23’s first era.97  
Falcon notwithstanding, this judicial favor continued throughout the second 
era, as reflected by a relaxed commonality requirement98 and a continued 
tolerance for the certification of Rule 23(b)(2) classes seeking back pay.99  
The substantive law of antidiscrimination evolved in a manner that 
disfavored class certification, but most of the decisions in this area came at 
decade’s end.100  Perhaps most important were a string of cases involving 
fees and expenses that likely increased costs for civil rights litigators.101  In 
 
 93. Telephone Interview with Joseph M. Sellers, supra note 47. 
 94. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of the United States:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 2, 102d Cong. 185 
(1991) [hereinafter Thomas Hearings Part 2] (statement of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights). 
 95. Telephone Interview with Joseph M. Sellers, supra note 47. 
 96. See, e.g., MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESS:  THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 131–45 (1990) (describing litigation brought to 
protect social security benefits in the 1980s). 
 97. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155–57 (1982). 
 98. E.g., Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 59–61 (3d Cir. 1994); Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 
987 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1993); Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 676 (10th Cir. 1988).  
For decisions that all but ignored Falcon, see, e.g., Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 
F.2d 326, 332–33 (4th Cir. 1983); Nelson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 709 F.2d 675, 679 (11th Cir. 
1983). 
 99. E.g., Probe v. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 100. For a list of the cases, mostly from the end of the 1980s, and their anticipated effects 
on antidiscrimination litigation, see Hearings on H.R. 4000, the Civil Rights Act of 1990—
Volume 1, Joint Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor & the H. Subcomm. on Civil 
& Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 788 (1990) [hereinafter 
Joint Hearings on the Civil Rights Act—Volume 1].  The 1991 Civil Rights Act promptly 
nullified some of these decisions. Robert Belton, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Future 
of Affirmative Action:  A Preliminary Assessment, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1085, 1085 n.1 (1992). 
 101. See generally Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987); Evans 
v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986); Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 
478 U.S. 546 (1986).  On the effect of these decisions, see, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 4000, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1990—Volume 3:  Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 101st 
Cong. 358 (1990) (statement of Charles Silver, Professor, University of Texas at Austin 
School of Law); Hearings on H.R. 4000, the Civil Rights Act of 1990—Volume 2:  Joint 
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor & the H. Subcomm. on Civil & 
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Evans v. Jeff D.,102 for example, the Supreme Court ordered the enforcement 
of a fee waiver insisted upon by a state government as a condition for its 
agreement to settle for the full scope of injunctive relief the class sought.103  
It rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that “strong public policy 
considerations” favored the award of “attorney’s fees in suits in which 
representative parties serve interests broader than their own self-interest.”104 
Reagan administration policies, discussed further below,105 surely 
strengthened the headwinds that civil rights litigation faced.  During Clarence 
Thomas’s chairmanship, for example, the EEOC committed more resources 
to the investigation of individual claims of discrimination and fewer to 
broader patterns.106  The EEOC also contributed less to private enforcement 
efforts, whether by providing plaintiffs’ lawyers with fewer materials from 
investigations, or by ceasing to support private antidiscrimination litigation 
with amicus briefs.107  As one prominent civil rights lawyer recalled, a 
“concern almost to the level of fanaticism” with any sort of numbers-based 
remedy led the Reagan administration to oppose class certification if 
plaintiffs’ Rule 23 arguments rested in part on a claim that they could 
establish the defendant’s liability with statistical evidence.108  Other relevant 
developments included a 25 percent cut to the LSC’s budget in 1982109 and 
the rightward pressure Reagan’s appointments exerted on the federal 
bench.110 
To one leading antidiscrimination lawyer, civil rights class actions had 
turned into “ground wars in Asia” by 1989.111  Just two small firms brought 
Title VII class suits for profit during the decade.  One only began to make 
money in 1986 after a decade of taking on huge financial risk.112  The firm 
 
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 502 (1990) [hereinafter 
Joint Hearings on the Civil Rights Act—Volume 2] (statement of Herbert B. Newberg, Esq.) 
(attaching a letter from Michael Churchill to Herbert B. Newberg dated Mar. 14, 1990); Julie 
Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s:  The Dichotomy Between Reality and 
Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 219–20 (1997); Rose, supra note 84, at 1174. 
 102. 475 U.S. 717 (1986). 
 103. On the effects of Jeff D., see Joint Hearings on the Civil Rights Act—Volume 2, supra 
note 101, at 499 (statement of Herbert B. Newberg, Esq.) (attaching a letter from Louis Rulli 
to Herbert Newberg dated Mar. 14, 1990). 
 104. Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 105. See infra notes 273–79 and accompanying text. 
 106. Telephone Interview with Barry Goldstein, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with 
Joseph M. Sellers, supra note 47. 
 107. Chambers & Goldstein, supra note 92, at 256–57; Telephone Interview with Barry 
Goldstein, supra note 87; Telephone Interview with David Cashdan, Partner, Cashdan & 
Kane, PLLC (June 7, 2016). 
 108. Telephone Interview with Joseph M. Sellers, supra note 47.  
 109. Andrew Barlow, Wrong Way to Reform:  Capping ‘Litigation Explosion’ Misses the 
Real Problem, B. LEADER, Nov.–Dec. 1984, at 21, 23. 
 110. See George M. Sickler, Jr., Protecting the Class:  The Search for the Adequate 
Representative in Class Action Litigation, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 73, 74 (1984); see also Jon 
Gottschall, Reagan’s Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals:  The Continuation of a 
Judicial Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48, 51–52 (1986). 
 111. Wicker, supra note 83, at 29 (quoting Joseph Sellers). 
 112. Vicki Quade, A League of Their Own:  Treating Civil Rights Law as a Business, HUM. 
RTS., Spring 1994, at 8, 9–10. 
2018] THE MODERN CLASS ACTION, PART II 1801 
won a $157 million settlement in a gender discrimination class action against 
the insurer State Farm in 1992, the largest deal ever struck in an 
antidiscrimination case at the time.113  But this victory came after the 
investment of 550,000 hours of attorney time.114  “Not too many lawyers 
want to wait 12 years to be paid,” the firm’s founder said in 1994, explaining 
why so few colleagues had joined him on his side of the aisle.115 
2.  The Antitrust Class Action 
Private antitrust filings fell significantly during the 1980s, from roughly 
1500 in 1980 to about 600 in 1989.116  Class actions constituted some of these 
cases and presumably diminished at roughly the same rate.  The remaking of 
antitrust law in the late 1970s and 1980s, coupled with the Reagan 
administration’s antitrust policy, kneecapped what had been a well-
established, lucrative preserve of the most powerful plaintiffs’ lawyers in the 
country.117 
These changes became the real story of the 1980s, but the era began with 
another one, involving the infamous Fine Paper litigation.118  Harold Kohn, 
the godfather of the country’s class action bar,119 challenged a lavishly 
excessive fee petition his cocounsel filed,120 which sought $21 million in fees 
for a case that settled for $50,650,000.  After thirty feet of acrimonious filings 
by one-time colleagues and a seven-week hearing, the episode produced a 
468-page opinion painting a sordid portrait of attorney greed and excess.121  
“I regret to say,” the Fine Paper judge concluded, “that my inquiry has given 
 
 113.  Philip Hager, State Farm to Pay Women $157 Million for Job Bias, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
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 114. See Quade, supra note 112, at 10.  See generally Runaway Train, AM. LAW., July–
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 119. James B. Stewart, Jr., The $300-Million Paper Case, AM. LAW., July 1979, at 20, 21. 
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WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1983, at C1. 
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substance to the worst fears of the critics of the class action device—that it is 
being manipulated by lawyers to generate fees.”122 
Kohn worried that Fine Paper would “kill the goose that lays the golden 
egg.”123  But it was another case involving a wood-pulp product that nearly 
produced significant legislative blowback to the antitrust class action.  
Stephen Susman, then an unknown antitrust ingénue,124 won an appointment 
as lead counsel in the Corrugated Container litigation125 in 1977 when 
squabbling among the plaintiffs’ bar left him as an acceptable 
compromise.126  Allegations that several dozen box manufacturers fixed 
prices ultimately generated a $550 million settlement, with $40 million in 
fees—then a record fee for a class action.127 
However successful, Corrugated Container prompted a powerful 
backlash.  Susman had employed a “system of escalation” strategy that put 
significant pressure on defendants to settle.128  Because antitrust liability was 
joint and several, class counsel could offer a sweetheart deal to the first 
alleged coconspirator to come to the table, regardless of the defendant’s 
market share, without diminishing the class’s capacity to recover the entirety 
of its damages.  Each settlement would leave fewer and fewer defendants 
with more and more potential liability, with treble damages, and with no 
contribution rights in the offing.129 
Susman struck deals with dozens of defendants, but the Mead Corporation 
refused, so it went to trial and lost.  Facing $750 million in liability,130 Mead 
sought relief from Congress,131 intensifying a multiyear effort to reform the 
law of antitrust remedies and damages allocation that would last throughout 
the Reagan years.132  The campaign included all of the familiar tropes in 
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debates over class action policy.  Mead’s supporters repeatedly told the story 
of an innocent small business whipsawed by the class action.133  Decrying 
the “moral equivalent of extortion,”134 they lamented the intense settlement 
pressure class actions generate that places trial off the table and forces 
defendants to pay without regard to true liability.135  They castigated 
unscrupulous plaintiffs’ lawyers stirring up “meretricious antitrust litigation” 
for their own benefit, not for that of their clients.136 
Mead escaped by settling for $45 million.137  Legislative efforts ultimately 
failed,138 but they proved unnecessary.  The Supreme Court issued a series 
of decisions, beginning in 1977 before Fine Paper, and with increased pace 
in the 1980s, “that sold the soul of competition to the devil,” as Susman 
complained in 1987.139  Decisions of lower courts in the 1980s, the U.S. 
General Accounting Office commented after a comprehensive survey, also 
reflected a defendant-friendly view that “most markets are naturally 
competitive.”140 
Added to this substantive legal change was a “retrenchment of federal 
antitrust policy,” spearheaded by prominent Chicago school academicians 
who headed the DOJ’s Antitrust Division for parts of the 1980s.141  This 
development was important because private antitrust cases often grow out of 
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government enforcement.142  The Antitrust Division filed more criminal 
cases during the Reagan years than before,143 but these prosecutions left 
alone Fortune 500 companies, targeting instead “a hapless, economically 
trivial parade of . . . commercial pygmies” who were unlikely to attract 
plaintiff-lawyer attention.144  Civil filings and investigations initiated by an 
underfunded and undermanned Antitrust Division collapsed.145 
By 1986, as one antitrust lawyer lamented, “there are . . . almost no national 
class actions being brought in the antitrust field today.”146  Titans of the 
antitrust bar drifted into other class action fields.147  Susman, the antitrust 
wunderkind of 1977, described himself as a former antitrust lawyer just nine 
years later.148 
*          *          * 
By the end of the 1980s, the class action had retreated significantly in two 
areas—antitrust and civil rights—that had been important to its development 
during the previous decade.  The federal courts of appeals and the Supreme 
Court had exited the class action arena, as had Congress and the Advisory 
Committee.  The class action’s shrunken profile, however, did not preclude 
significant developments in the jurisprudence and discourse of aggregate 
procedure. 
II.  LITIGATION AND LEGITIMACY 
By 1995, the class action began to attract close attention from an expanded 
network of advocates pursuing reform in multiple institutional venues.  How 
did the device move from offstage in the 1980s to center stage in the mid-
1990s?  Several hypotheses are plausible.  A simple cyclical explanation is 
but one.  Having sparked much heat in the 1970s, the class action was bound 
to reemerge sometime, and the end of another procedural episode created a 
vacuum that Rule 23 naturally filled.149  Perhaps civil justice reformers 
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redirected limited lobbying resources away from causes, such as tort reform 
and deregulation, that had attracted significant effort.  The rest of this Article 
stresses the importance of a series of exogenous shocks, including the 
asbestos-litigation crisis and securities fraud litigation spawned by the S&L 
debacle that jolted the class action landscape and attracted reformers’ 
attention. 
Each of these answers, on its own and however partially explanatory, 
misses the forest—a sprawling debate over litigation’s legitimate role—for 
the trees.  The class action has always tested the boundaries of judicial 
power’s legitimate exercise.  Skeptics have often flogged the class action as 
an emblem of what they perceive as an abusive or otherwise illegitimate 
litigation system.  This is exactly what happened during the class action’s 
second era, with increased partisanship and urgency.  Starting in the 1970s, 
critics of American civil justice began to question the governing power courts 
could legitimately exercise through their supervision of litigation, and they 
began to doubt the capacity of courts to wield this power successfully.  The 
debates over litigation and legitimacy had obvious relevance to the class 
action and especially to the proper conception of what it is for.  To some 
critics, the class action exemplified the litigation explosion150 and the 
imperial judiciary’s modus operandi.151  The fight intensified, grew more 
partisan over the 1980s and into the 1990s, and attracted a larger and more 
diverse array of participants.  As it did so, it all but guaranteed that the class 
action would return to political and policy agendas. 
A.  The Imperial Judiciary 
In the 1970s, critics of American civil justice began to complain of two 
interrelated phenomena.152  The first, the so-called “litigation explosion,” 
allegedly resulted from Americans’ pathological litigiousness153 coupled 
with the failure of civil litigation’s rules and institutions to allow only claims 
warranted under applicable laws to pass through courthouse doors.154  The 
litigation-explosion narrative had its origins in the mid-1960s over worries 
that population growth and technological change would cause lawsuits to 
spike.155  Critics of the class action quickly latched onto such concerns as 
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fodder for their views.156  But early on, those anxious about rising claims did 
not necessarily support procedural retrenchment.157  Supporters of the 
Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, for example, stressed the litigation-
explosion narrative to advocate for a reform that preserved and even 
facilitated the filing of claims.158  By the mid-1970s, however, the narrative 
had turned into advocacy for limits on litigation’s availability and power.159 
The second phenomenon involved the alleged rise of an “imperial 
judiciary,” as Nathan Glazer described it in 1975.160  By the mid-1970s, 
critics insisted, courts had illegitimately assumed for themselves power over 
an ever-expanding array of social, political, and economic problems for 
which the other branches of government had previously shouldered 
responsibility.161  Litigation, traditionally conceived, functioned as a 
“grievance-answering process,”162 Donald Horowitz argued, in which 
individuals presented fact-specific disputes with limited public significance 
to otherwise passive courts for adjudication.163  Imperious judges, in contrast, 
treated litigation as a “problem-solving” process,164 with cases serving as 
“mere vehicles for an exposition of more general policy problems.”165  
Individual litigants and their identities receded from the courts’ gaze.166  
“Broad class[es] of people”167 replaced these “ghostly plaintiffs”168 as they 
sought to achieve significant change to existing social orders through 
litigation. 
Critics denounced this development on at least two grounds.  First, courts 
do not capably handle complex, sprawling problems that implicate webs of 
social, economic, and political concerns.169  The imperial-judiciary 
phenomenon laid bare the limits to courts’ institutional incompetence, as did 
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the litigation explosion.  Second, as Nathan Glazer lamented, the imperial 
judiciary was antidemocratic and ipso facto illegitimate.170 
Responses to the litigation-explosion and imperial-judiciary narratives 
challenged their empirical premises.171  The most important theoretical 
rejoinder, at least to the imperial-judiciary charge, came from Abram 
Chayes.172  He agreed with Glazer, Horowitz, and others, that “[i]n our 
received tradition, the lawsuit is a vehicle for settling disputes between 
private parties about private rights.”173  The process so conceived seeks 
compensation for disruptions to an accepted social or economic order and, 
thus, has a preservative or restorative effect.174 
But Chayes argued that litigation’s proper institutional role had morphed 
into something different by the mid-1970s, with a “public law” model of 
litigation ascendant.175  Litigation was no longer in essence a “bipolar” affair 
between two private parties.176  Its institutional footprint had expanded to 
include “sprawling and amorphous” endeavors “about the operation of public 
policy” litigated by groups.177  This change reflected the modern reality that 
“a host of important public and private interactions—perhaps the most 
important in defining the conditions and opportunities of life for most 
people—are conducted on a routine or bureaucratized basis and can no longer 
be visualized as bilateral transactions.”178  Groups can legitimately seek 
transformative changes to social, economic, or political orders through 
lawsuits, for litigation does not stand apart from political or administrative 
processes but functions as a substitute.179  For this reason, remedies entail 
not just redress for discrete harms suffered by individuals but also behavior 
and policy modification to benefit diffuse members of the public. 
Chayes identified, if somewhat vaguely, justifications for the sort of 
judicial power contemplated by the public law model.180  Public law 
litigation could mobilize claims and thereby vindicate substantive policy that 
might otherwise lie dormant.181  Ultimately, however, Chayes argued that the 
success of the public law model depended upon the breadth of its acceptance 
 
 170. Glazer, supra note 160, at 122; see also Patrick K. Dooley, Beware of the “Imperial 
Judiciary,” B. LEADER, Sept.–Oct. 1978, at 22, 24–25. 
 171. E.g., Barlow, supra note 109, at 21; David M. O’Brien, “The Imperial Judiciary:”  Of 
Paper Tigers and Socio-Legal Indicators, 2 J.L. & POL. 1, 56 (1985). 
 172. Chayes’s importance is indicated by his selection to defend against the “imperial 
judiciary” charge at a 1978 American Enterprise Institute conference. DALY, supra note 152, 
at 2–3.  His adversaries at the discussion were Antonin Scalia and Laurence Silberman. Id. 
 173. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1282 (1976). 
 174. Id. at 1302. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1289. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 1291. 
 179. Id. at 1304. 
 180. Id. at 1314. 
 181. Id. at 1314–15; Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1891 Term—Foreword:  Public 
Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 27 (1982). 
1808 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
as an institutional fact, or “the power of judicial action to generate assent over 
the long haul.”182 
It was precisely this possibility of assent that receded in the 1980s.  As 
noted, litigation politics circa 1980 were not obviously partisan.183  Neither 
were doubts about public law litigation and its legitimacy.184  But the Reagan 
administration adopted the litigation explosion as an article of faith,185 and 
throughout the decade conservatives expressed anxiety over, and at least 
rhetorical opposition to, the imperial judiciary.186  Both narratives at least 
partially motivated Republicans to pursue significant policy initiatives in the 
early 1990s,187 by which point partisan divides over litigation reform had 
deepened and hardened.188 
B.  Class Action Jurisprudence 
Both critics and Chayes agreed that the class action was the natural 
procedural form for the litigation they either faulted or celebrated.189  First, 
as Chayes explained, the device gave procedural expression to the 
understanding of the scope of interests at stake when litigation vindicates 
public policy on some aggregate basis.190  As he argued, the class was a 
“single jural entity,” not “a congeries of individual claims,”191 reflecting 
“burgeoning . . . theories about groups (as opposed to individuals) as rights 
bearers.”192  Also, litigation can better offer a competent substitute for 
politics if it proceeds in aggregate fashion.193  The class action invites all 
participants to think of the plaintiffs as representatives of coalitions.  It 
requires a remedial lens that broadens considerably from a focus on an 
individual’s needs to what benefits an undifferentiated population. 
The larger war over litigation and legitimacy had obvious implications for 
the normative terrain on which class action battles would be waged.  As 
mentioned, dueling conceptions or understandings of what the class action is 
for emerged soon after 1966.194  To proponents of the regulatory conception, 
a class was not an assembly of discrete individuals, but a group of 
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undifferentiated regulatory beneficiaries on whose behalf litigation pursues 
vindication of a substantive policy regime.  The class action existed to 
mobilize claims.  The civil rights litigators, plaintiffs’ lawyers, and 
progressive judges who advanced this view emphasized the regulatory 
efficacy of the substantive law, not individualized compensation for class 
members, as litigation’s goal.  The regulatory conception provided a 
normative justification for a powerful class action device because it 
deemphasized differences among individual class members’ claims and the 
particular relief owed to them as subordinate to the regulatory imperative the 
class action furthered.195 
Defense counsel, industry representatives, and others uncomfortable with 
powerful class action litigation argued for the adjectival conception.  They 
viewed Rule 23 as a mere joinder device, no different in its essence than any 
of the other joinder rules, and certainly not a device with a particular 
regulatory mission.  Rule 23 took the claims of otherwise disconnected 
individuals and allowed their assembly in one case for the sake of litigation 
efficiency.  Individual relief remained the litigation’s primary goal, and any 
other benefits the class action might create were incidental.196 
If the litigation-explosion narrative were correct, then a device designed to 
mobilize claims only worsened problems caused by failing efforts to keep 
inappropriate cases out of the courts.197  If the imperial-judiciary charge were 
right, then class action doctrine crafted to minimize the relevance of 
individual-litigant identities and thereby facilitate the certification of 
undifferentiated plaintiff groups, as the regulatory conception urged, only 
further enabled judicial usurpation of political branches’ power.198  
Conversely, if Chayes’s public law model properly described litigation’s 
legitimate role, then the adjectival conception paid undue heed to individuals 
and their interests—the outdated focus of litigation as traditionally 
conceived. 
As the rest of this Article explains, each of the class action’s major 
episodes during the 1980s and early 1990s was a battle in a larger war over 
litigation and legitimacy.  In debates over civil rights, mass torts, and 
securities fraud class actions, arguments about litigation’s illegitimate use 
posed challenges to the class action’s regulatory conception, and, with it, the 
most important normative basis for a powerful Rule 23. 
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III.  THE CIVIL RIGHTS CLASS ACTION 
AND THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY 
As part of their campaign against the imperial judiciary, conservatives in 
the 1980s targeted the civil rights class action, the paradigmatic form of 
public law litigation.  The class action per se did not interest them.  What 
rankled was what its aggressive use implied for civil rights litigation, that 
groups of undifferentiated regulatory beneficiaries could advance some set 
of extraindividual interests through the courts.  Reagan administration 
lawyers fought the notion of group rights, a central pillar of Chayes’s public 
law model, as part of their efforts to reorient antidiscrimination policy.  
Conservatives also inveighed against the LSC class action.  They attacked it 
for what it signified to them about litigation—that the process enabled groups 
to pursue political objectives in court. 
A.  The Antidiscrimination Class Action 
1.  Group Rights and Antidiscrimination Law in the 1970s 
Racially progressive judges enthusiastically supported the Title VII class 
action in the 1960s and 1970s as a primary means for the vindication of 
antidiscrimination policy.199  They blessed these cases with preferential 
procedural treatment, a favor that included courts’ willingness to certify 
“across-the-board” classes.200  An African American employee who had 
failed to receive a promotion, for example, could represent not just other such 
employees but also African Americans whom the employer had failed to hire, 
notwithstanding possible conflicts of interest among them.201  In fact, the 
named plaintiff did not even need to suffer employment discrimination 
herself to represent the class, provided that she shared the class members’ 
race and was a former or current employee.202  The Supreme Court pushed 
back slightly in 1977, holding in East Texas Motor Freight System Inc. v. 
Rodriguez203 that named plaintiffs who “were not members of the class of 
discriminatees they purported to represent . . . [are] simply not eligible to 
represent a class of persons who did allegedly suffer injury.”204  Reading 
Rodriguez narrowly,205 some lower courts continued to certify across-the-
board classes into the early 1980s.206 
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The across-the-board suit posed a number of puzzles.  For instance, how 
exactly does an employee who was not promoted have standing to sue on 
behalf of applicants who were not hired, an injury the former obviously did 
not suffer?207  For the public law model, which the Title VII class action 
exemplified, this question gave little pause.  Some argued in the 1970s and 
early 1980s that Title VII protects minority groups, not particular individuals, 
against discrimination.208  Put differently, antidiscrimination rights do not 
guarantee every individual protection against differential treatment on the 
basis of race, but rather protection for disadvantaged groups against policies 
and practices that subordinate them.209  Likewise, properly crafted class 
action remedies should end a subordinated status, causing a transformation 
that focuses on structural change, not individual remediation.210 
Class action procedure fit the group rights understanding of Title VII 
perfectly.211  As the Ninth Circuit reasoned in 1977, “[e]mployment 
discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin is by definition class 
discrimination[,]” and for this reason “class actions are favored in Title VII 
actions.”212  If groups suffered the relevant harm, then individual plaintiff 
characteristics bear little on the accurate adjudication of a defendant’s 
liability.213  The named plaintiff “just happen[s] to be the member of a group 
subjected to the racial classification.”  She is better understood as “merely 
the catalyst” for litigation,214 not its central figure.  No good reason exists to 
limit a case to an individual’s claim. 
This match between procedural form and the contours of the substantive 
right generated a number of doctrinal consequences.  For example, courts 
could justifiably certify classes under Rule 23(b)(2), which minimized both 
the relevance of individual issues of law and fact to the class-certification 
decision,215 and which does not require that notice go to all individual class 
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members.216  The group-rights understanding also encouraged evidentiary, 
remedial, and substantive developments that significantly facilitated the 
certification of Title VII classes.  If liability could be proven with statistical 
evidence,217 then class-wide common questions of law or fact existed.  
Likewise, the legal plausibility of remedies benefiting groups of employees, 
not just those devised for the particulars of a specific employee’s situation, 
enabled class-wide adjudication.218  Disparate-impact liability focuses “on 
protected groups,” not an employer’s motive with respect to particular hiring 
or promotion decisions,219 and thus was substantive law ideally suited to 
class litigation.220 
2.  The Conservative Campaign Against Group Rights 
The group-rights understanding of antidiscrimination law supported 
affirmative action, busing, and other such interventions aimed at social 
transformation.221  As such, it was anathema to the Reagan administration.222  
Its personnel challenged the jurisprudential basis for these remedies.223  
William Bradford Reynolds, who headed the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division 
from 1981 to 1988,224 faulted the idea of group rights as “a fundamental 
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distortion of civil rights in a democratic society.”225  Administration lawyers 
instead advocated for what the NAACP, describing Clarence Thomas’s 
views, labeled a “radical individualism” in antidiscrimination law and 
policy.226  “[A] triumph for civil rights” happens, Reynolds argued in 1984, 
when “[t]he individual right to be free from racial discrimination [wins] out 
over a claim of group entitlement.”227  “Our country is not a group of groups,” 
he insisted, and “our laws protect individuals, not classes.”228  Likewise, 
Thomas insisted on “defending the rights of individuals” and claimed that 
“[t]hose who insist on . . . preferences for certain groups have relinquished 
their roles as moral and ethical leaders.”229 
This view influenced DOJ and EEOC litigation policy.230  “Each case is 
essentially different” and “people should be treated as individuals,” the chair 
of the Reagan transition committee for the EEOC insisted.231  Thus, “class 
action suits” are inappropriate, as they are a “boondoggle for civil rights and 
labor lawyers.”232  An insistence that only “actual” or “identified” victims of 
discrimination deserve remedies disfavored the pursuit of remedies for 
groups without proof of every member’s injury.233  Also, if discrimination 
happens only to discrete individuals, then a defendant’s liability should 
require each alleged victim to prove his or her injury separately.  This 
obligation poorly fits class-wide litigation.234  The administration 
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discouraged disparate-impact theories,235 acceptance of statistical evidence 
as proof of discrimination,236 and remedies not tailored to specific 
individuals.237 
The DOJ ceased its support of private class actions.238  It filed an amicus 
brief in Falcon on behalf of the employer, suggesting a restrictive 
interpretation of Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement and taking three 
pages to argue for an adjectival conception of Rule 23.239  This shift pointedly 
broke with the regulatory conception that prior administrations had 
advocated—that the class action existed to enable broad vindication of 
antidiscrimination policy on behalf of classes of people.240  The EEOC filed 
many fewer class actions in 1988 than it did in 1980,241 pursuing class actions 
based only on “complaints filed by individuals” and not on the “observation 
of a statistical disparity.”242  The agency’s remedial policy of stressing full 
recovery for every identified victim of discrimination diverted resources 
from investigations of systemic discrimination.243  Thomas insisted that the 
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EEOC could better implement a “comprehensive policy” through the pursuit 
of individual cases.244 
B.  The LSC and the Law/Politics Divide 
The Reagan administration’s individualism-centered view of 
antidiscrimination law and policy fit a larger jurisprudential perspective that 
assigned the pursuit of group interests to political processes, not litigation.245  
Conservatives’ insistence upon a sharp boundary between law and politics, a 
tenet threatened by the imperial judiciary’s rise, found expression in another 
1980s-era fight implicating the class action.  Chayes’s public law model of 
litigation, one consistent with the class action’s regulatory conception, 
assigned litigation a transformative role.  To conservatives in the 1980s, 
however, litigation properly pursued individual remediation and thus repairs 
to a torn social fabric.  Transformation of an existing social or economic order 
happened through politics.  Conservatives advanced this argument about 
litigation and legitimacy as part of their effort to end the LSC class action.246 
1.  The LSC Class Action 
The origins of modern government-funded legal services coincided with 
Rule 23’s revision in 1966.  Before the mid-1960s, legal assistance involved 
individual client service directed at discrete, particularized problems of poor 
people,247 an emphasis fitting a decentralized, sporadically funded 
infrastructure for legal aid.248  This notion also reflected assumptions about 
poor people and their legal needs.  Poverty resulted either from 
macroeconomic calamities, such as depressions, or individual moral failings, 
not from an unjust or oppressive legal order in need of transformation.  Legal 
aid gave deserving individuals seeking divorces or fighting their landlords 
the same access to an essentially just legal system that those with means had, 
that is, their own individual days in court.249 
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 created the Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO), the LSC’s predecessor agency.250  It began a new era for 
legal services, one that would continue after Congress replaced the OEO with 
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the LSC in 1974.251  Millions of dollars in government funding helped to 
finance the proliferation of nonprofit legal-services centers, staffed by a 
sizeable cadre of attorneys committed to the nascent public-interest-law 
movement252 and coordinated by a set of regional and national offices that 
helped to organize legal and policy objectives and strategies.253  Law reform 
quickly became a particular priority,254 reflecting an understanding of 
poverty as generated by systemically unjust social and economic 
structures.255  The poor as a class256 shared a cause that required not only 
individual client service but also a “revis[ion of] the structure of the world in 
which the poor live.”257  Poverty lawyers should seek broad, impersonal 
remedies, not ones individually crafted to the circumstances of particular 
poor persons.258 
This ideology was the essence of public law litigation, and it fit the 
regulatory conception perfectly.  The class action was a key part of this new 
“legal consciousness” for legal services.259  “The poor are viewed as a class, 
not individuals with legal problems,” a White House memorandum observed 
while commenting on a perceived view prevailing among supporters of legal 
services.260  For this reason, the memo continued, LSC lawyers have “a 
preference for class action suits and test cases rather than more routine 
individual representation.”261  The LSC’s defenders in later years would 
stress the miniscule proportion of the total amount of government-funded 
litigation represented by class actions, noting that the LSC lawyer’s daily diet 
included divorces, personal bankruptcies, landlord-tenant disputes, and other 
such individualized matters.262  But statistics imperfectly indicated the class 
action’s importance.263  For one thing, the absolute number of class actions 
that OEO- and LSC-funded lawyers litigated was sizable, even if dwarfed by 
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the vast number of legal matters they generally handled.264  For another, class 
actions had outsized importance for the LSC’s mission.265 
2.  Conservative Opposition 
“No issue animates the conservative movement as much as its desire to 
eliminate or meaningfully reform the Legal Service [sic] Corporation,” Paul 
Weyrich wrote in a 1988 memorandum to Newt Gingrich.266  Conservatives 
blamed the LSC for all conceivable conservative bugbears, ranging from 
“welfare rights” to “environmental extremism,” and from “transsexualism” 
to “Cesar Chavez, Ralph Nader, [and] Angela Davis.”267  The transformative 
litigation the LSC pursued contributed importantly to this animosity.  The 
American Enterprise Institute noted in 1973 that OEO lawyers brought “class 
action suits designed to benefit not just a single client, or a small group, but 
thousands in the affected class” to achieve “a radical restructuring of society 
through a process insulated from the safeguards of popular representation and 
democratic process.”268  “This is not simply related to politics,” Spiro Agnew 
complained one year earlier, “it is politics.”269  Glazer singled out LSC class 
actions in his famous 1975 article on the imperial judiciary.270 
Such critiques notwithstanding,271 LSC-funded litigation flourished 
through the 1970s.272  The Reagan years, however, witnessed unrelenting 
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warfare against the LSC.273  The Reagan administration’s transition-team 
report on legal services recommended that the “legal-political LSC” should 
be ended.274  President Reagan’s first proposed budget would have zeroed 
out the LSC’s funding.275  He appointed William Olson, one of the report’s 
authors, to the LSC board, along with William Harvey, a law professor who 
derided the LSC as “the greatest political fraud ever perpetrated.”276  
W. Clark Durant, who championed the LSC’s abolition, chaired the LSC 
board from 1984 to 1988.277  Throughout the decade, the LSC’s new 
leadership pursued policies and other actions designed to thwart the 
effectiveness of prominent LSC-funded groups278 and to undermine the 
LSC’s capacity to assist public law litigation.279 
Conservatives challenged LSC litigation as a prime example of an 
illegitimate distortion.280  Lawyers must “distinguish politics from law,” Ed 
Meese demanded in remarks he delivered in 1981 defending the 
administration’s LSC policy.281  William F. Buckley insisted in 1986 that 
“the service of lawyers” involves “how to fetch up the Social Security check 
that hadn’t been issued, or to get the divorce, or get child assistance from the 
delinquent father,” matters consistent with litigation traditionally conceived 
and the preservation of an existing social order.282  But LSC by the 1980s 
had turned into “a lobby . . . to influence legislatures [and] Congress . . . to 
rally around the socialist flag.”283  “Social and political change through the 
judicial process,” not “the civil legal problems of the poor,” were grist for the 
LSC’s mill, a CATO Institute monograph entitled Destroying Democracy 
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asserted.284  With language redolent of the imperial-judiciary complaint, the 
transition-team report asked rhetorically, “is it proper, in terms of the 
separation of powers, for a lawyer to force resolution by courts of policy 
issues that ought to be left to legislatures?”285 
LSC class actions, “an emblem” of the LSC’s flaws,286 were the procedural 
vehicles that contorted litigation “into a political movement,”287 distorting 
“the judicial process” from “a forum to resolve specific, individual disputes” 
into “a town meeting.”288  Phyllis Schlafly, the new right’s doyenne, 
denounced LSC-funded lawyers for “creating clients, initiating class-action 
suits, litigating and lobbying, to restructure society according to their own 
radical notions.”289  Human Events, Reagan’s favorite newspaper,290 derided 
“class-action suits” as a “weapon[]” used “to promote . . . sweeping changes 
in the nation’s economic, social and political structure.”291  Critics equated 
LSC class actions with political activity like lobbying.292 
Conservatives tried to kill the LSC class action.  To end ideological 
joyriding and “get Legal Services out of litigation politics,” board members 
Harvey and Olson proposed regulations in 1982 that would have required 
class members to opt in to an LSC-sponsored class action, essentially 
undoing Rule 23 for these cases.293  Congress opted for a watered-down 
alternative.294  Efforts at limiting LSC class actions continued throughout the 
decade.295  Ultimately, however, they did not succeed until 1996, when 
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Congress prohibited LSC-funded entities from participating in class actions 
entirely.296 
*          *          * 
The regulatory conception stresses as the class action’s mission the broad 
vindication of a substantive-liability regime on behalf of groups.  The idea 
that litigation could mobilize groups, while deemphasizing individual-
litigant identities as mostly irrelevant, was precisely what conservatives 
hostile to an imperial judiciary castigated with their attempt to reset 
antidiscrimination litigation and combat the LSC.  The civil rights episode 
entangled understandings of the class action’s purpose with fundamental and 
deeply politicized debates over litigation’s legitimate use. 
III.  MASS TORTS 
AND THE CHANGING CLASS ACTION NETWORK 
The mass tort class action episode differed from 1980s-era fights over 
antidiscrimination and poverty litigation in at least two relevant ways.  First, 
its politics were muddled.  Institutional need, not partisan advantage, 
propelled Rule 23’s entry into the mass tort arena.  Also, the doctrinal 
changes occasioned by the civil rights class action paled in comparison with 
what personal injury litigation prompted.  In 1979, a Massachusetts federal 
district judge issued a tentative, limited order certifying the first dispersed 
mass tort class.297  In 1984, the Second Circuit tempered its grudging 
approval of class certification in the famous Agent Orange litigation with the 
expectation that Chief Judge Jack Weinstein’s order would not “encourage 
the use of similar procedures by . . . district courts in the future.”298  Just five 
years later, the Fourth Circuit described as “obvious . . . [the] movement 
towards a more liberal use of Rule 23 in the mass tort context,”299 and in 
1991 a report on asbestos litigation by an ad hoc committee of federal judges 
insisted that “class actions were devised for precisely these kinds of 
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cases.”300  The key doctrinal steps of the second era, including, for example, 
new rules for settlement class actions, came mostly in mass tort cases. 
Nonetheless, a thread of litigation and legitimacy ties the mass tort and 
civil rights episodes together.  Rule 23’s use for mass torts accelerated 
because of its potential to help judges and litigants manage burgeoning tort 
dockets.  The mass tort class action did not catalyze but responded to the 
litigation explosion, something class action adversaries did not always 
understand.  But the mass tort class action highlighted, albeit in somewhat 
different guise, the institutional challenge that prompted criticism of an 
imperial judiciary.  It required judges to step out of their institutional role, as 
traditionally understood, and forthrightly seize legislative and bureaucratic 
mantles. 
This Part eschews a chronological telling of the mass tort class action’s 
story, which I offer in a companion article.301  Instead, it describes several 
aspects of the mass tort class action that proved particularly significant, 
including the changes it prompted to the network of people and institutions 
involved with the class action and to the issues of law and policy the class 
action implicated. 
A.  New Complications 
1.  An Illustrative Episode 
July 17, 1981, offers as good a starting date as any for the mass tort class 
action’s story.302  At 7:00 p.m., just as a popular “Tea Dance” began,303 two 
skywalks in a lobby of a Kansas City, Missouri, Hyatt Hotel collapsed.304  
One hundred people died, hundreds more suffered physical injuries,305 and 
up to two thousand onlookers witnessed the calamity.306  Trial lawyers filed 
the first individual cases three days later.307  Within seven months 150 
individual cases were on file, mostly in a Missouri state court,308 and the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers had grouped together informally to coordinate their 
litigation.309  In preliminary settlement discussions, the defendants hinted at 
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an expected punitive-damages liability approaching $500 million.310  Within 
six months, the defendants had paid out over $18 million, settling over 120 
individual lawsuits.311 
Coordinated discovery was proceeding312 and cases were settling313 when 
Judge Scott Wright, known as an unconventional jurist,314 settled on a class 
action as the best way to serve three goals:  “to decide who was responsible, 
to compensate the victims fairly, and to get the matter resolved as efficiently 
as possible.”315  Wright bent over backward to certify a Rule 23(b)(1) limited 
fund class.316  Because Missouri law might not permit a jury to award 
punitive damages in more than one case, he reasoned, all plaintiffs should be 
joined in a single action to enable the pro rata distribution of any recovery.317  
Also, Wright opined, a class action would ensure the “expeditious[] 
adjudicat[ion]” of the Skywalks litigation “with a minimum of repetition, 
expense, and delay.”318 
The defendants did not want this outcome, and 175 class members filed 
affidavits opposing it.319  Suddenly stripped of their cases, the Kansas City 
personal injury bar protested loudly, denouncing the prominent class counsel 
Wright selected as “the anti-Christ.”320  The trial lawyers sought mandamus, 
and the Eighth Circuit obliged.  The mandatory class-certification order, it 
concluded, stayed pending state actions and thus violated the Anti-Injunction 
Act.321  Judge Wright tried again on remand, certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class,322 but the defendants leveraged the conflict between class counsel and 
the Kansas City trial lawyers to get the latter’s agreement to a $20 million 
settlement on behalf of everyone who opted out of the federal class.323  
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Anyone who released his or her claim got an immediate $1000 payment, with 
no proof of injury.  The settlement drained the class of all but twenty-four 
members, a result so thoroughly disgusting to one of the class counsel that he 
donated his sizable fees to charity.324 
2.  A Changing Network 
Skywalks was a mass accident case and for this reason not that 
revolutionary.325  The paradigmatic mass accident case comes after an 
airplane crash.  The disaster injures all victims at the same time, in the same 
place, and in the same way.  Causation is often common and straightforward, 
and a single state’s tort law often applies to all victims’ claims.  As early as 
1969, courts found common issues of law and fact to predominate and 
certified mass accident classes.  By 1982, when Wright seized control of the 
Skywalks litigation, he could draw upon ample, if disputed, precedent.326  
Exposure to a dangerous product, like asbestos or a flawed drug, produces a 
dispersed mass tort.  These are harder to litigate in the aggregate.  Victims’ 
injuries develop at different times, in different places, and have a less 
straightforward causal connection to the defendant’s conduct. Whether 
exposure to a dangerous drug causes heart attacks, for example, can easily 
differ from plaintiff to plaintiff.  Different states’ laws can apply when 
victims purchase, take, and are injured by a dangerous drug in different states. 
Courts uniformly refused to certify dispersed mass-tort classes before 
1979.327  The real innovation therefore came a year before Skywalks, when 
Judge Spencer Williams, another judicial iconoclast, certified the first 
significant dispersed mass-tort class in litigation involving the Dalkon Shield 
intrauterine birth-control device.328  But Skywalks is a good starting point 
because it foreshadowed a number of significant developments that the mass 
tort class action catalyzed. 
The first involves the network of people and institutions engaged with class 
action law and policy.  Personal injury lawyers engaged with Rule 23 in a 
sustained way for the first time.329  Importantly, these lawyers often resisted 
class certification, as they did in Skywalks, opening a new front against Rule 
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23’s aggressive deployment that had not existed in the 1970s.330  A class 
action brought on behalf of a class of public schools to recover the costs of 
asbestos abatement jeopardized fee-generating relationships individual tort 
lawyers had with their clients.  “You have got to be the greatest asshole that 
ever stepped into a court of law,” one of these lawyers wrote to David Berger, 
class counsel in the School Asbestos litigation,331 “and I would like to go to 
my blessed reward knowing that I personally met the greatest at 
something.”332  Asbestos litigation devolved into a bitter civil war over the 
class action, ultimately pitting Ron Motley and Joe Rice, perhaps the 
country’s most powerful asbestos litigators,333 against Fred Baron, their chief 
competitor for this distinction.  Implacably and bitterly opposed to an 
asbestos class action,334 Baron spent $4.5 million fighting major asbestos 
class settlements, eventually spurring the Supreme Court to render its first 
significant class action decisions since Shutts in 1984.335 
The involvement of personal injury lawyers contributed to another change 
to the network of personnel and institutions involved with class action law 
and policy.  The mass tort class action prompted the federal courts of appeals, 
such as the Eighth Circuit in Skywalks, to open their doors to interlocutory 
review that had been closed since the 1970s, and thus again to supervise class 
certification decisions.336  By one calculation, nearly half of interlocutory 
appeals or mandamus petitions that yielded appellate opinions on class action 
doctrine between 1987 and 1996 came in mass tort cases.337  This activity 
ultimately convinced the Advisory Committee to create Rule 23(f) and 
thereby to regularize this appellate supervision.338 
This appellate engagement resulted in significant part from the efforts of 
personal injury lawyers fighting for control of their individually filed cases.  
Defendants, the natural constituency for appellate review of class 
certification orders, increasingly acquiesced in or moved for class 
certification when they thought they could obtain a global settlement of their 
mass tort liability on acceptable terms.339  The economics of personal injury 
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litigation meant that plaintiffs filed hundreds or even thousands of cases as 
individuals, with no need for the class action to mobilize claims.340  To 
resolve their mass tort liability, defendants could continue to litigate and 
settle cases individually, declare bankruptcy, or litigate in some aggregate 
fashion.  Redundant costs, the prospect of uncoordinated punitive damages 
awards, and an unending drip-drip-drip of potentially catastrophic lawsuits 
made the first option unattractive and in some instances led ineluctably to the 
second.341  Rule 23 promised a number of advantages over Chapter 11, 
including enhanced control over the company’s future ownership, a way to 
avoid the stigmatizing effects of bankruptcy,342 and more say over the 
payment of claims.343  Defendants’ newfound ardor for Rule 23 peaked in 
Amchem, when twenty asbestos companies and class counsel jointly filed a 
motion for class certification and a proposed settlement agreement on the 
same day the plaintiffs filed their complaint in January 1993.344 
By the early 1990s, Rule 23 had become a “strategic management tool” for 
a number of companies, not necessarily an instrument of corporate doom.345  
This embrace of Rule 23, coupled with appellate courts’ reengagement, 
produced the only significant doctrinal innovations of Rule 23’s second era.  
These included an increased willingness to relax class certification 
requirements to facilitate settlement classes.  In 1982, the Second Circuit 
described the “tentative designations of class for settlement purposes” as “the 
subject of considerable controversy,”346 and in 1984 the Sixth Circuit treated 
the notion of a settlement-only class with skepticism.347  The Fourth Circuit 
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in 1989 expressed much more enthusiasm for settlement-only classes,348 
however, and by the mid-1990s the certification of settlement-only classes 
was “common.”349  Amchem again illustrates just how relaxed Rule 23’s 
requirements became.  In his 1994 class certification decision, Judge Lowell 
Reed ignored the balance of common and individual issues the plaintiffs’ tort 
claims raised, the typical fodder for a predominance determination, and 
instead declared that class members’ common interest in prompt, reasonable 
payments from a settlement fund satisfied Rule 23(b)(3).350 
The Advisory Committee reentered the network of class action actors.  An 
ad hoc committee appointed by Chief Justice William Rehnquist to study the 
asbestos-litigation crisis recommended in 1991 that the Advisory Committee 
consider rule changes to facilitate the certification of mass tort classes.351  
The Advisory Committee obliged,352 ultimately proposing an amendment 
designed “to enlarge the opportunity for mass tort litigation.”353 
3.  Changing Issues 
Along with new participants, the mass tort episode prompted and 
strengthened new arguments and ideas about the class action’s purpose and 
perils.  Some strained to justify the certification of mass tort classes in terms 
of the regulatory conception.354  As the Skywalks example suggested, 
however, litigants hardly needed Rule 23 to mobilize.  Also, defendants’ 
attraction to the device rebutted the suggestion that the class action unleashed 
tort law’s regulatory power.355  In some instances, the mass tort class action 
may have prompted more claims than might otherwise have emerged, but 
these claims probably did not belong in the tort system by any metric of 
plausibility.356  In the Breast Implants litigation of the early 1990s, for 
example, lawyers with phone numbers like 1-800-RUPTURE generated a 
huge and unanticipated influx of highly questionable requests for 
compensation after the announcement of the class settlement.357 
The reasons Wright gave for his turn to Rule 23 in Skywalks became 
standard justifications for the certification of personal injury classes:  judicial 
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efficiency and distributional equity.358  Judge Spencer Williams explained 
that the “tedious and frustrating task of presiding over individual lawsuits” 
might “bankrupt both the state and federal court systems” to justify his class 
certification decision.359  Also, payouts determined by individuals’ race to 
judgment might leave “later plaintiffs . . . without practical means of redress” 
as the defendants’ funds ran dry.360  Chief Judge Jack Weinstein similarly 
based his decision to certify the Agent Orange class in part on a distributional 
concern.361  The law of punitive damages might cap the defendants’ liability, 
and thus the first plaintiffs to win punitive-damages judgments would 
unfairly reap all the spoils.362  Concern for judicial resources and delayed, 
inequitable compensation for victims likewise fueled a class action strategy 
to resolve the asbestos quagmire.363 
The mass tort episode also altered and deepened concerns about the class 
action’s use for collusive purposes.  Observers had long feared that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers would use aggregate procedure to collude with defendants and settle 
liability cheaply;364 indeed, the prospect prompted opposition to the 1966 
amendments to Rule 23.365  Before the mass tort episode, however, the most 
famous alleged instance of collusion in class actions did not involve class 
counsel and defendants enriching themselves at class-member expense, but 
it instead involved problems of the sort that prompted criticism of an imperial 
judiciary.  In Simer v. Rios,366 LSC lawyers and the defendant, a federal 
antipoverty agency, settled a class action in 1980 that required the agency to 
continue to fund certain energy initiatives that benefited poor people.  The 
settlement gave the agency, which wanted to continue with the program, a 
basis to ignore congressional instructions to return the money.367  The 
settlement troubled critics not because class members got ripped off but 
because the agency supposedly used litigation to “circumvent[]. . . 
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congressional intent.”368  This effort to “achiev[e] social and political change 
through the judicial process”369 was collusion for the public law litigation 
era, when litigation raised legitimacy concerns if it strayed onto legislative 
terrain. 
The discounted settlement struck in Skywalks was a harbinger, and by 
1994, Amchem had replaced Simer as the new archetype of collusion.370  
Plaintiffs’ lawyers with already-filed asbestos cases refused a deal that would 
have swept their clients into a single class action.371  To get their cooperation 
with a class action settlement that would resolve all future claims to be filed 
against the defendants, John Coffee and others argued, companies bought off 
these lawyers with separate side deals for their inventories that appeared to 
pay their fee-generating clients more than what the class settlement 
contemplated for class members.372  Amchem exemplified collusion for an 
age of what Coffee calls “entrepreneurial litigation,” one where the class 
action’s problems are not thought of in Chayesian, public law terms but 
instead center on who got what money from whom and under what 
conditions.373 
B.  Mass Torts, Litigation, and Legitimacy 
Just as the mass tort episode changed the class action’s network and the 
issues it implicated, so too did it alter the connection between Rule 23 and 
larger debates over litigation and legitimacy.  Its mere association with 
personal injury litigation tarred the class action with the litigation-explosion 
brush, even as defendants increasingly viewed Rule 23 as a liability 
containment device, not an accelerant.374  A New York Times op-ed in 1985 
castigated “[c]lass-action shakedowns,” citing litigation against “the morning 
sickness drug Bendectin” as an example,375 despite the fact that Bendectin’s 
manufacturer had actually filed the class-certification motion.376  A 
prominent pundit complained that the Breast Implants class action had 
“bludgeoned” Dow Corning “into throwing $2 billion into a ‘global’ 
settlement” that destroyed the company,”377 apparently oblivious to the fact 
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that Dow Corning had pursued a class action settlement to avoid 
bankruptcy.378 
To more thoughtful critics, the turn to Rule 23 as a response to disasters 
like the asbestos-litigation crisis raised the imperial-judiciary problem.  
Descriptions of the imperial judiciary presented the federal judge as the 
dominant figure in public law litigation.  Weinstein may have played this role 
willingly in Agent Orange.379  But in other mass tort episodes, especially 
asbestos, judges wielded Rule 23 more defensively, in a desperate effort to 
corral an onslaught of lawsuits that barely remained within their control.380  
If Chayes’s public law judge forthrightly and aggressively straddled the 
divide between law and politics, most federal judges turning to Rule 23 to 
manage mass tort dockets approached the limits of their institutional 
competence reluctantly.381 
But the imperial-judiciary problem nonetheless remained.  When parties 
proposed to resolve mass torts with settlement class actions, they arguably 
pushed judges to the limits of their traditionally understood institutional 
roles.382  Commenting on asbestos and other mass torts, John Coffee 
complained in 1994 that such episodes “converted [judges] . . . from neutral 
umpires, adjudicating factual disputes, into problem-solving bureaucrats 
dispensing social justice.”383  To those who saw in the federal judge’s role 
an institutional distortion, the situation arguably reached its nadir in 1993, 
when an asbestos company filed a class action not to litigate its liability but 
to seek “court assistance . . . to negotiate and eventually approve a settlement” 
that would lay this liability to rest.384  The district court lacked “adjudicative 
powers” for such faux disputes, the Second Circuit concluded.385 
By one view, the mass tort class action pushed judges to wield the 
equivalent of not only bureaucratic but also legislative powers.386  All class 
settlements arguably have a legislative effect.  Without their consent, class 
members lose one right, the right to sue, and gain another, the right to claim 
compensation from a fund.  For negative-value class actions of the sort 
contemplated by the regulatory conception, this legislative outcome is 
consequential in form only.  Class members’ preexisting claims are minimal, 
so for any particular class member, losing that right in exchange for some 
payout has little real significance. 
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For mass torts, in contrast, preexisting rights to sue often have genuine 
value, as evidenced by the avalanche of individual suits that prompted judges 
and lawyers to turn to Rule 23.  While legislatures may have the authority to 
displace tort law rights to sue, courts test the boundaries of their proper 
capacities when they bless privately negotiated efforts to do the same.  
Whether and how to replace the tort system for injured claimants “are heady 
policy questions for federal judges,” Coffee wrote in 1994.387  But the 
Constitution does not contemplate judges wielding such power, he insisted:  
“The task of crafting solutions to complex social problems properly belongs 
to the legislature.”388 
To Robert Parker, an innovative judge in east Texas who took the first 
stabs at using Rule 23 for asbestos claims, ordinary tort litigation for asbestos 
reminded him of “the classical tragedies” and warranted something 
different.389  Upholding Parker’s certification of an asbestos class, the Fifth 
Circuit noted, “If Congress leaves us to our own devices, we may be forced 
to abandon repetitive hearings and arguments for each claimant’s attorney to 
the extent enjoyed by the profession in the past.”390  The ad hoc committee 
on asbestos reasoned similarly, referencing the class action and insisting that 
“failing congressional action, the federal judiciary must itself act 
now . . . .”391  But Congress’s failure to act ultimately proved unconvincing 
as a justification for courts exercising equivalent power through the class 
action.  When the Fifth Circuit scuttled a second attempt by Parker to manage 
his asbestos docket with a class action, it concluded with the following: 
We are told that [Parker’s plan] is the only realistic way of trying these 
cases; that the difficulties faced by the courts as well as the rights of the 
class members to have their cases tried cry powerfully for innovation and 
judicial creativity.  The arguments are compelling, but they are better 
addressed to the representative branches—Congress and the State 
Legislature.  The Judicial Branch can offer the trial of lawsuits.  It has no 
power or competence to do more.392  
The Supreme Court made the same point when it rejected the global 
asbestos class settlement in Amchem Products v. Windsor393 and effectively 
ended the mass tort class action experiment.  Rule 23, the Court insisted, 
“cannot carry the large load . . . heaped upon it.”394 
Mass tort litigation attracted new participants, with confusing new 
preferences, into the class action arena.  It required significant doctrinal 
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change, and it pushed courts to test the limits of their capacity to exercise 
power.  But Rule 23’s reach expanded even as the regulatory conception, the 
chief justification for a powerful class action, proved inapposite.  Unlike the 
other episodes of the class action’s second era, the mass tort class action 
experiment did not trigger partisan rancor.  Nonetheless, the stakes 
involved—victims had real compensation at stake, defendants faced 
potentially ruinous liability, and swollen dockets portended massive court 
congestion—made urgent some determination of where legitimacy 
boundaries for courts lay. 
IV.  SECURITIES REFORM, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION, 
AND CLASS ACTION POLITICS 
The civil rights and mass-tort episodes implicated the class action in 
narratives about public law litigation and the imperial judiciary.  The 
securities fraud episode connected the class action to the litigation explosion, 
the other important narrative challenging litigation’s legitimacy during the 
second era. 
The class action has always attracted criticism from those convinced that 
a litigation explosion had engulfed American civil justice.395  In 1973, the 
Fortune article that arguably gave the phenomenon its name complained in 
its first paragraph that “class-action suits” had “bec[o]me a kind of popular 
sport.”396  But litigation-explosion politics through the 1980s centered on 
issues that had little or nothing to do with class action procedure, such as 
product-liability doctrine and punitive damages.397  A DOJ working group 
studying a perceived liability-insurance crisis did not mention the class action 
when it attributed the problem to a surge in litigation in 1986.398  Dan 
Quayle’s Council on Competitiveness ignored the class action entirely in its 
set of twenty-two reforms offered to improve American civil justice.399  But 
the emphasis changed in the early 1990s.400  Led by accounting firms and 
Silicon Valley, a set of business interests harnessed litigation-explosion 
rhetoric to demand changes to the securities fraud class action.401  These new 
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entrants into the class action network successfully pushed class action reform 
onto Congress’s agenda. 
A.  The Changing Landscape of Securities Fraud Class Actions 
1.  Securities Fraud Litigation in the 1970s and 1980s 
From the new Rule 23’s first days, securities litigators recognized how the 
1966 revisions could empower their suits.402  Appreciating the class action’s 
regulatory function,403 sympathetic judges early on wrought changes to the 
underlying substantive law, decreasing plaintiffs’ obligations to provide 
individualized evidence of their victimization and thereby facilitating class 
certification.404  These developments attracted criticism, of course.405  
Anticipating reformers’ rhetoric by twenty years, a 1974 article insisted that 
securities fraud class suits “follow[] on the heels of every stock market bust,” 
that plaintiffs in them settle for a small percent of the claimed damages, that 
law firms race to the courthouse with photocopied complaints listing “the 
lawyer’s mother” as class representative, and that defendants settle frivolous 
cases rather than litigate them.406 
By the end of the 1970s, however, the securities fraud class action began 
to enjoy a period of relative tranquility.  Securities fraud litigation had 
proceeded in an aggregate fashion before 1966,407 so the new class action, 
while important, was not revolutionary.  Stock market volatility in the 1970s 
was muted, with fewer of the drastic swings in share price that tend to attract 
the plaintiffs’ bar’s attention.408  Also, this litigation was relatively modest 
in size, with antitrust litigation being more lucrative.409  Jockeying among 
antitrust lawyers prompted abuses and drew negative public scrutiny.  
Securities fraud litigation, a backwater in comparison, attracted few entrants 
in the 1970s.410  Abe Pomerantz, an “iconic legend” with an unimpeachable 
reputation for quality lawyering, dominated the securities bar.411 
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Securities fraud litigation escalated significantly in the 1980s.412  In 1987, 
a securities fraud case settled for $440 million;413 a settlement struck in 1988 
exceeded this sum, then a record for class actions, by $260 million.414  With 
this uptick came considerable attention,415 particularly as the arriviste 
Milberg Weiss replaced the Pomerantz firm as the top dog.416  A number of 
causes likely fueled this upheaval.  The substantive law evolved to favor 
plaintiffs, especially with the entrenchment of the fraud-on-the-market 
doctrine.417  Increased market volatility in the 1980s418 and a surge in initial 
public offerings419 may have contributed.  But a concentrated burst of 
litigation against accounting and high-technology firms had particular 
consequences for class action history.  These two industries bore 
characteristics that particularly enabled them to pursue a political solution 
once the liability pressure proved too much to bear.420 
2.  Auditor Liability 
Accounting firms audit companies’ financial statements in connection with 
a number of transactions, producing reports for various audiences that 
include shareholders.421  Traditionally, if a transaction soured, the auditor 
could rely on a privity requirement to shield itself from liability that might 
otherwise arise from professional negligence or even intentional 
wrongdoing.422  This doctrine began to fracture in the 1960s,423 just as the 
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modern class action emerged,424 and by the end of the decade accountants 
began to face liability under the securities laws.425 
By the mid-1980s, the accounting industry had begun to complain that the 
litigation explosion was engulfing its members.426  Firms did face higher 
litigation exposure by the early 1980s.  Turns in the business cycle427 and a 
weakening of norms of audit professionalism within firms428 are plausible 
explanations for this development.  But accounting-industry representatives 
faulted more general causes, including Americans’ “urge to litigate” and a 
breakdown in a sensible tort system.429 
Although private securities fraud litigation composed only a “fraction” of 
all lawsuits against accountants by the end of the 1980s, it had begun to draw 
outsized attention.430  The S&L crisis of the 1980s hit auditors hard,431 a 
factor that surely helped fuel the precipitous escalation of firms’ liability 
risk.432  S&L institutions were required to have an independent audit 
performed every year to help federal regulators determine if they were 
managed properly.433  S&L deregulation in the early 1980s led to risky and 
even fraudulent business behavior,434 which auditors failed to document or 
account for.435  S&L bankruptcies left accounting firms as the remaining 
deep pockets.436  Charles Keating and his Lincoln Savings & Loan, perhaps 
the decade’s most notorious collapse, produced more than $100 million in 
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liability to shareholders and bondholders of the country’s “Big Six” 
accounting firms.437 
The rise of Milberg Weiss, which “perfected the technology of mass 
production” of securities fraud litigation,438 also explains the added heat 
auditors felt by the end of the decade.  The firm’s first major victory came in 
1973 in a securities fraud case against an accounting firm.439  Mel Weiss, 
himself an accountant, quickly added more notches to his belt, and his 
penchant for and expertise in suing auditors served the firm well throughout 
the 1980s.440  Ernst & Whinney, for instance, was a codefendant in an 
enormous bond default case Milberg Weiss brought against the Washington 
Public Power Supply System.  It settled in 1989 for $584 million.441 
Between 1989 and 1994, the Big Six settled somewhere in the 
neighborhood of 110 private class actions.442  They accounted for 14 percent 
of all securities fraud defendants in 1990, 30 percent in 1991, and a whopping 
56 percent in 1992.443  The bill for their 10b-5 liability in 1992 alone ran to 
$373.8 million.444 
3.  High-Technology Liability 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers also concentrated their fire on high-technology 
companies in the 1980s and early 1990s.445  Twice as likely to be sued than 
companies in other industries,446 high-tech firms were defendants in one-
third of securities class actions settled between July 1991 and June 1993, 
paying out more than $440 million to class members.447  Several reasons 
might explain their exposure.  First, the software industry took off in the 
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1980s,448 with Silicon Valley industries exploding in number and size.449  
Silicon Valley firms tended to place a premium on rapid innovation by the 
1980s, while older competitors stagnated with more traditional emphases on 
risk aversion and quality control.450  To critics of securities fraud litigation, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers needed little more than a sharp drop in share price to bring 
suit,451 and volatility plagued Silicon Valley firms.452  Other factors included 
the large numbers of IPOs in the high-technology sector453 and the high rates 
of share turnover for these firms.454 
Finally, high-technology companies often hyped new products early and 
aggressively, even though their products failed at particularly high rates.455  
To plaintiffs’ lawyers, this tendency made Silicon Valley “a complete hotbed 
of fraud.”456  It certainly attracted Milberg Weiss’s attention.  Bill Lerach 
headed the firm’s West Coast office.  His career took off with a big settlement 
in 1985,457 just as Silicon Valley was heating up.  He trained his considerable 
energies and attention on high-tech companies, and by the early 1990s he was 
Silicon Valley’s bête noire.458 
B.  The Push for Reform 
1.  The Origins of the PSLRA 
Sometime around late 1990 or early 1991, the Big Six accounting firms 
began to consider possible responses to the mounting liability pressure they 
felt.459  Analyzing the firms’ litigation, their lawyers concluded, first, that 
accountants were paying large sums to defense firms, and second, that injured 
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plaintiffs received little of the proceeds of settlements the firms funded.460  
At nearly the same time, Janet Cooper Alexander published her influential 
article “Do the Merits Matter?,” in which she argued that factors like the size 
of market losses, the amount of insurance coverage, and the defendant’s 
ability to pay, not the strength of the plaintiffs’ case on the merits, determined 
settlement outcomes.461  Similarly, Vincent O’Brien argued in the Wall Street 
Journal that settlement amounts in securities fraud class actions had little to 
do with the merits of claims and that securities fraud litigation created little 
benefit, if any, for shareholders.462  These threads merged into a story about 
securities fraud class actions:  the merits had little to do with their outcomes, 
plaintiffs barely benefited from them, and they cost a lot in attorney’s fees.463 
The Big Six seized advantage of a fortuitous opportunity to push this 
narrative.  In June 1991, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Lampf, 
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,464 in which it borrowed a 
short statute of limitations favored by defendants for securities fraud 
claims.465  Threatened with the dismissal of many cases then pending in the 
federal courts, the plaintiffs’ bar turned to Congress for a legislative fix.466  
A bill quickly emerged from the Senate Banking Committee before the Big 
Six could mobilize any opposition.467 
By October 1991, however, the accountants had flipped an effort to 
liberalize securities fraud litigation into a four-year campaign for reform.468  
The Big Six’s initial goal was simply to slow down or stop the Lampf-repealer 
legislation.469  But from the outset the firms steered congressional attention 
to what they believed were fundamental flaws with securities class actions.470  
At the first hearing on Lampf-repealer legislation, for example, a prominent 
lobbyist for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
drew upon Alexander’s and O’Brien’s work to argue that Congress should 
address “frivolous litigation that often benefits nobody but the lawyers.”471  
Reformers sent a summary of Alexander’s article to Christopher Dodd, soon 
to sponsor the PSLRA in the Senate.  It found its way into the hearing 
record.472 
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The Lampf-repealer legislation’s quick enactment in November 1991 came 
with a price exacted by a fledgling group of legislators interested in reform:  
a commitment that Congress would consider “measures to reduce meritless 
litigation” and “meaningful securities litigation reforms” at its next 
session.473  Commenting on this plan, Senator McConnell noted that, as “a 
proponent of comprehensive tort reform,” he was “pleased that [Congress] 
will be examining the litigation explosion in this area of the law” when it 
reconvened.474 
2.  The Campaign for Reform 
Leading the charge, the Big Six started a Coalition to Eliminate Abusive 
Securities Suits (CEASS).475  But their role in the S&L crisis compromised 
them as poster children for reform.476  High-tech companies, “thought to be 
the Garden of Eden of America,” as one lobbyist recalls, took over as the 
primary “spokesmodels.”477  They attracted important support from 
moderate Democrats who otherwise tended to favor consumer groups and 
trial lawyers.478 
CEASS’s campaign only consistently targeted one aspect of class action 
procedure.  Reformers repeatedly complained of the use of the same 
shareholder as class representative in case after case,479 but otherwise they 
suggested reforms of either the substance of the securities laws (i.e., 
proportionate and not joint and several liability) or of aspects of procedure 
that lacked any necessary connection with the class action device (i.e., a 
heightened pleading standard and a loser-pays-fee rule).480 
But CEASS’s efforts centered on a depiction of the securities class action 
as predatory and ineffective.  Urging a version of the regulatory conception, 
supporters of the status quo defended class actions as a needed supplement 
to the SEC’s power to enforce the securities laws.481  The litigation explosion 
gave reformers a counterargument, one that helped them redefine the issues 
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involved in ostensibly regulatory litigation.  Some regarded litigation “as a 
means of carrying out social policy” or as “a substitute for laws and 
regulations.”482  But this justification fails in an era dominated by “a whole 
new breed of legal professionals, who go on fishing expeditions to find any 
basis at all on which they may file class-action suits” and who “pay[] bounties 
to professional class representatives” to file “cookie-cutter complaints.”483  
Among the primary themes in litigation-explosion discourse were claims that 
lawsuits are meritless, costs unjustified, and results unwarranted by 
defendants’ conduct or the substantive law.484  By harnessing this rhetoric, 
reformers could effectively blunt a defense of the class action rooted in the 
regulatory effect it had. 
A number of well-established litigation-explosion claims surfaced 
repeatedly in the campaign for reform.  These included a characterization of 
plaintiffs’ lawyers as “betrayers of trust” who serve their own interests and 
no one else’s.485  To Senator Dodd, the “entrepreneurial role of some 
plaintiffs’ attorneys in securities class action cases” led them to “essentially 
shop for clients in whose name they can file a case” so that they can “control 
the litigation and settlement . . . with little or no influence from either the 
‘named’ plaintiffs or the larger class of investors.”486  What results are “cheap 
settlements” that do nothing for investors but generate a “generous fee 
award.”487  The charge that lawyers like Lerach used the same class 
representative over and over again tapped into litigation-explosion rhetoric 
about sham plaintiffs.488  Lerach infamously declared in 1993 that he had 
“the greatest practice of law in the world” because he “ha[d] no clients.”489  
This boast gave vivid support to reformers’ claim that securities litigation did 
nothing for plaintiffs and only served to enrich lawyers.490 
Proponents of the regulatory conception had long soft-pedaled direct 
financial benefits to class members as immaterial to the class action’s 
success, stressing instead its capacity to vindicate substantive liability policy.  
But reformers challenged the class action on this terrain, denying that 
securities class actions accomplished legitimate law enforcement goals.  
Claims of meritless litigation’s ubiquity were a staple of litigation-explosion 
rhetoric in the 1980s.491  Reformers levied this charge against securities fraud 
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litigation with an oft-told “atrocity story”492 of “[p]redatory plaintiffs’ 
lawyers routinely fil[ing] suit when a public company’s stock declines” and 
“lob[bing] barrages of computer-generated pleadings” at innocent 
defendants.493  With litigation expenses mounting, defendants settle 
regardless of the underlying merits,494 a result that undercuts any regulatory 
value these cases would otherwise promise.495 
Not only did these cases serve no legitimate law enforcement objectives, 
reformers argued, they also inflicted severe costs on the American 
economy—yet another litigation-explosion trope.496  To Billy Tauzin, the 
PSLRA’s sponsor in the House, plaintiffs’ lawyers’ shakedown racket was 
“killing other investors’ opportunities to make profit and to grow small 
businesses in America, and it is killing jobs, and it is hurting people who want 
to start up new companies.”497  In the 1980s, accounting firms insisted that 
their rising tort liability was pushing auditors to limit their business, just as it 
forced doctors to practice defensive medicine.498  Firms in the early 1990s 
alleged the same effect and blamed a surge in securities fraud litigation.499  
Representatives of high-technology companies likewise insisted that 
securities fraud litigation “threaten[ed]” its industry’s “competitiveness.”500 
Reformers used yet another staple of litigation-explosion discourse, 
“assertions about aggregate patterns” suggesting a system out of control that 
proved baseless, exaggerated, or at least very difficult to prove 
empirically.501  The Big Six faced dramatically rising insurance costs, the 
head of AICPA insisted,502 consuming 9 percent of audit revenue by 1991.503  
Supporters of the status quo insisted that the figure was closer to 1.6 
percent.504  Plaintiffs filed over 600 securities class actions between 1990 and 
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1991, accountants insisted, a “tripling” since 1988.505  Controlling for 
duplicative findings, the PSLRA’s opponents responded that the real number 
was much lower, and the rate of filings had only inched up.506  Reformers 
claimed that “virtually all cases . . . settled,” regardless of merit.507  
Opponents asserted that courts dismissed 40 percent of cases brought against 
the Big Six at the pleading stage.508  Plaintiffs sued “anytime” a stock price 
fell by 10 percent.509  Opponents claimed that such stock drops prompted 
litigation much less frequently.510  Claims that plaintiffs’ lawyers settled 
cases for sums that bore little relationship to the merits, the critique that 
Alexander, O’Brien, and the Big Six had begun with, proved particularly 
important.511 
Finally, reformers made ample use of “global characterizations.”512  
Litigation against accountants was “out of control.”513  “Everybody gets 
sued,” Tauzin complained,514 insisting that “poison is in the well and we 
ought to get it out.”515  Managers of high-technology firms are well on their 
way to spending “half their time in litigation discovery proceedings, and the 
other half looking over their shoulders for predatory lawyers.”516 
Newt Gingrich, then minority leader in the House, agreed to include 
securities fraud litigation reform as an item in the “Contract With America” 
he and his Republican colleagues were touting on the campaign trail in 
1994.517  The effort to pass the PSLRA was hard fought.  Jonathan Cuneo 
headed the National Association of Shareholder and Consumer Attorneys 
(“NASCAT”) in the early 1990s and as such was the chief legislative 
strategist resisting the statute’s passage.  As late as August 1994, Cuneo 
recalls, the reform campaign was “cresting” and “unlikely to continue.”518  
But CEASS totally outgunned the plaintiffs’ lawyers, exceeding NASCAT’s 
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lobbying effort by over $100 million.519  Steve Toll, a leading plaintiffs’ 
securities lawyer, describes the situation with a vignette: 
I remember . . . a time where we had a big snow storm in the D.C. area, and 
I ended up picking up some guy who couldn’t get up a hill near my 
house . . . .  We started talking, and ends up the guy’s a lobbyist, and he 
was working for various high tech companies . . . .  I was telling him what 
I did, and telling him about the powerful effort to get the law changed and 
make securities class actions go away, or make them impossible or more 
difficult to bring.  I told him we had this one law firm we were using as our 
lobbyist on Capitol Hill . . . .  He laughed and said, “Oh my God.  That’s 
what you have.  Do you realize how many corporations are out there, 
throwing $50,000 to $100,000 at lobbyists, and you guys have this one little 
puny firm?  Talk about David and Goliath!”520 
By a week before the November 1994 midterm elections, with Republicans 
headed toward a historic congressional win, Cuneo knew that his “goose was 
cooked.”521  Right after the Republicans’ smashing triumph, he could 
identify only fifteen senators as solid votes against the PSLRA.522 
*          *          * 
The securities fraud episode entangled the class action in a politicized fight 
over litigation and legitimacy.  The lines of attack reformers opened had 
direct significance for the regulatory conception.  The litigation-explosion 
narrative that accounting firms and Silicon Valley developed challenged the 
conception’s justificatory force.  If courts lacked the tools to ensure that only 
meritorious lawsuits proceeded, then a device designed to mobilize claims 
could not be counted upon to achieve appropriate levels of regulation through 
litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
The election of the Contract with America Congress is a good place to end 
the story of the class action’s second era.  Little of concrete, lasting import 
had happened to Rule 23 or class action doctrine by the end of 1994.  The 
PSLRA’s enactment remained a year away.523  The statute prohibiting LSC-
funded class actions did not pass until April 1996.524  The Advisory 
Committee in 1994 buried the proposed revisions to Rule 23 that the ABA 
Special Committee had recommended.525 
But change was afoot.  At the start of the 1980s, the two most populous 
class action fields, antitrust and civil rights, were declining, and district courts 
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were the only venue that remained open for doctrinal evolution.  By the end 
of the class action’s second era, the device’s footprint had arguably never 
been larger.  1994 witnessed not only Judge Reed’s approval of the Amchem 
settlement but also the approval of the $4.225 billion Breast Implants class 
settlement.526  That year, plaintiffs’ lawyers also convinced a district judge 
to certify a personal injury class of people with hemophilia harmed by HIV-
tainted clotting-factor products—for litigation purposes, not just 
settlement.527  By one count, securities fraud litigators filed 231 class actions 
in 1994, a four-year high.528  Private lawyers had begun to make real money 
litigating Title VII class actions, litigation that had been left for dead by the 
end of the 1980s.529  Notwithstanding Reagan-era attacks, poverty lawyers 
were involved in hundreds of class actions nationwide.530 
The pendulum would quickly swing, beginning with the PSLRA’s 
enactment in 1995 and a fierce reaction to the mass tort class action in the 
federal circuit courts.531  During the next ten years, all government 
institutions responsible for class action law and policy, including Congress, 
the Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court, and the intermediate courts of 
appeals, would extensively reexamine fundamental issues, with numerous 
and significant doctrinal consequences.  A leading plaintiffs’ lawyer 
expressed cautious optimism for the class action’s “newly invigorated life” 
in 1998.532  By 2005, when Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act 
to stymie a swath of this litigation,533 she would complain that “class actions 
have been reformed to death.”534 
Changes in how lawyers, judges, and others understood and discussed 
class action law and policy paved a road from the quiet of the early 1980s to 
the turbulence of the mid-1990s.  Marc Lackritz served as president of the 
Securities Industry Association during the early 1990s when the group threw 
its weight behind securities fraud class action reform.  He began a 
recollection of the campaign for the PSLRA with a revealing reflection: 
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I went to law school from roughly ‘68 to ‘73, and at that point, class actions 
were viewed as a way of righting social wrongs.  The people on the white 
horse were bringing class actions to stop smoking on airplanes and things 
like that . . . .  We thought, “What a great tool . . . to right social wrongs.”  
Then all of a sudden, I find myself, at the end of the 80s, beginning of the 
90s, where the class action[] has been flipped on its head, in a sense.  It’s 
become a lottery for plaintiffs’ lawyers and trial lawyers . . . .535 
Lackritz’s take on the class action circa 1973, “a great tool . . . to right 
social wrongs,” captures a Chayesian, public law idea about the legitimate 
use of judicial power.  It likewise well describes the regulatory conception of 
the class action.  To my mind, the significance of the second era lies in the 
collapse of faith that Lackritz experienced. 
The regulatory conception defined the class action’s primary function as 
the broad enforcement of substantive liability regimes on behalf of groups of 
undifferentiated regulatory beneficiaries.  It offered normative support to a 
powerful procedural device that downplayed individual litigants, their 
circumstances, and their needs in favor of muscular regulatory outcomes.  By 
connecting the class action to more fundamental debates over litigation and 
legitimacy, the three major episodes of the second era deepened the 
challenges that proponents of this conception faced.  The civil rights episode 
embroiled the class action in politicized debates over the imperial judiciary.  
To conservatives, antidiscrimination and LSC-funded class actions and the 
pursuit of structural reform on behalf of groups begged the question of what, 
if any, boundaries remained separating law from politics.  Asked about the 
imperial judiciary at his confirmation hearings in 1988, Paul Niemeyer 
featured the class action and its adjectival conception in his insistence on a 
divide between law and politics: 
The distinction between judicial resolution and legislation is that the former 
resolves the immediate good faith disputes of the parties whereas the later 
[sic] may resolve a dispute or impose a standard on society or a smaller 
class of persons.  To the extent that a judge seeks to impact a group beyond 
the litigants, he is distorting the judicial function.  Even the class action 
procedure should be viewed as a procedural device to resolve a multiplicity 
of good faith disputes simultaneously.  To the extent that it resolves claims 
not brought by actual litigants, the procedure is properly criticized.536 
Judge Niemeyer would chair the Advisory Committee when it proposed 
restrictive revisions to Rule 23 a decade later. 
The push for securities litigation reform connected the class action to the 
litigation-explosion narrative and implicitly, but unmistakably, challenged 
the case for the regulatory conception.  To reformers, whether litigation can 
legitimately discharge a regulatory task assumed facts not in evidence.  A 
rash of meritless securities fraud cases and settlements with no connection to 
the merits proved the class action’s incompetence to implement a regulatory 
regime, regardless of its legitimate power to shoulder the duty. 
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The mass tort class action placed even more stress on the normative 
foundation for a robust class action device.  The choice between a regulatory 
and an adjectival conception had little bearing on the problems posed by the 
aggregation of personal injury claims.  Some strained to make the regulatory 
conception relevant, but the effort did not really track how mass tort litigation 
played out.  Few of the district judges or lawyers pushing for a class action 
solution to the various mass torts of the 1980s and early 1990s identified 
claim mobilization or deterrence as a rationale for their turn to Rule 23.  The 
class action’s solution to the asbestos litigation crisis begged a lot of 
questions about efficiency and collusion for which 1970s-era debates over 
the class action shed little light.  Also, although defendants championed the 
class settlement as a response to a tsunami of individual lawsuits, Rule 23’s 
mere connection to tort litigation, the original font of the litigation explosion, 
further cemented the class action’s connection to this narrative.537 
The civil rights and securities fraud episodes pushed the class action 
further into partisan terrain.  Some resolution to questions of litigation’s 
legitimate use grew urgent as personal injury lawyers and defendants wielded 
Rule 23 as a response to the mass tort challenge.  The result, an expanded 
network of lawyers, judges, legislators, and rulemakers engaged with the 
class action, all but ensured that advocates would explore different 
institutional venues for policy change.  As doors to these venues opened, and 
as those with conflicting, politicized agendas rushed through them, the 
conditions coalesced for an era of reform to begin. 
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